Democratic institutions may constrain raw state coercion against opposition

Evidence

How generally, to what extent, and how, does the installation of formally democratic institutions inhibit raw forms of governmental coercion such as simply assassinating members of the opposition? β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 72

Categorization

  • QUESTION: This is precisely the asymmetry question the reader wants to test: institutional form inhibiting coercion is a regime-capacity question Tilly is setting up for the rest of the book.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 72
  • XREF: connects to: In mature democracies contention turns nonviolent unless state agents block it β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 428; Democratic states govern through a permanent state of exception rather than true crisis β€” Evelyn Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race…, 363; Coercive government power depends on voluntary cooperation from many (+6 more)

Broader Connections