Regime shifts can selectively open opportunity to specific activist constituencies while excluding others.

Evidence

In India, Congress’s losses in the 1989 election produced changes in all five elements that favored BJP activism. New centers of power were emerging within the regime; Congress’s decline opened the regime somewhat to new actors; the political scene was clearly becoming more unstable; at least for Hindu activists, influential allies and supporters were becoming more readily available; and (again at least for Hindu activists) the regime was moving toward facilitation of collective claim-making. Although the BJP did not yet dominate the government, its members of parliament provided new allies, however reluctant, to anti-Muslim activists. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1175

Categorization

  • QUESTION: This directly bears on the reader’s asymmetry test: POS openings here favor BJP (dominant-group) politicization not subordinate-group. Does Tilly’s framework anywhere account for group-asymmetric POS effects?
  • SEED: Possible angle: political opportunity is never group-neutral — every POS element can shift differently for different constituencies, undermining a flat ‘regime type determines repertoire’ causal story.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1175
  • XREF: connects to: Regime trajectory changes produce shifts in challengers’ political opportunity structure — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 629; Regimes shape political opportunity structure through toleration and forbidding choices — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 445; Regime actors divide into members, challengers, and outsiders by access. (+6 more)

Broader Connections