Capacity loss in nondemocratic regimes raises collective violence, as in the post-1985 USSR.

Evidence

If substantial shifts from regime type to regime type occur in the world, we should expect them to affect overall levels of collective violence. If high-capacity, nondemocratic regimes lose capacity-as happened widely in the disintegrating Soviet Union after 1985-we should expect levels of violence to increase (Beissinger 1998, 2001). — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 764

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 764
• XREF: connects to: Collective violence shifts with changing opportunity structures, not static conditions — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 817; Rising regime capacity loss triggered a collective theft spiral — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1234; Regime type determines the forms and intensity of collective violence — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 689 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Collective violence shifts with changing opportunity structures, not static conditions #expands (0.85) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 817
• Democratization without capacity loss first raises then lowers collective violence. #qualifies (0.85) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 765
• Loss of central authority leads to widespread societal chaos #expands (0.82)
• Regime type determines the forms and intensity of collective violence #expands (0.80) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 689
• Rising regime capacity loss triggered a collective theft spiral #exemplifies (0.78) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1234
• Modernization outpacing political institutions triggers revolutionary violence #corroborates (0.78)
• Intergroup violence can erupt without prior animosity when institutions fail and trust collapses #expands (0.75) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 655
• Regime capacity to mobilize violence depends on patron-client networks and assets #qualifies (0.73) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 83
• Negative sanctions and repression typically precede and provoke collective political violence #qualifies (0.72) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4357
• Saturation and retraction, not expansion, now generate violence #corroborates (0.72) — Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 247