War-of-attrition strategic logics only operate within regime-set limits and repertoires

Evidence

The strategic logic operates, however, within limits set by POS and established repertoires. It also depends on the availability and support of specialists in violence. After the Cold War ended, Laitin points out, small arms became much more widely and equally available to actors on both sides of African conflicts (Laitin 1999, 157; see also Boutwell, Klare, and Reed 1995). So, for that matter, did mercenary forces, available to those who could pay (or whose diasporas could pay) with resources drawn from the country and its external commerce (Davis and Pereira 2003; Singer 2003). Specifying the context takes us back to regimes, repertoires, and specialists in violence. β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 822

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly positioned for the asymmetry question β€” Tilly constrains rational-actor games with POS and repertoires, but does he test whether institutional absorption defuses subordinate politicization asymmetrically? β€” connects to: No coherent theory links regime type to forms of contention β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 42; Regime and repertoire correspond without being tautological β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1305; Military format constrains which class can dominate a regime β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 81 (+2 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 822

Broader Connections