British warfare built state capacity and de-democratized Britain before 1815.

Evidence

Think back to the trajectories of British regimes and repertoires between 1750 and 1840 described in chapter 3. Figure 5.3 reinterprets that earlier analysis in the light of this chapter’s arguments. It shows a British state increasing greatly in capacity and de-democratizing as a consequence of military buildups and ever-expanding warfare between the 1750s (Seven Years War, 1756–63) and the end of the immense wars with France (intermittently 1792–1815), then democratizing significantly with a slight drop in capacity thereafter. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 665

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to classic bellicist state-formation literature (Tilly’s own ‘war made the state’ thesis) as a comparative instance of the capacity-democracy tradeoff. — connects to: The Great War triggered extensive nationalization in Britain and Italy — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order: How Economists…, 188; Wars forced Britain’s tax base and government size to permanently expand. — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 389; State-led reform and national wars dominate the formation of modern states
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 665

Broader Connections

• Wars forced Britain’s tax base and government size to permanently expand. #expands (0.95) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 389
• State-led reform and national wars dominate the formation of modern states #expands (0.85)
• The Great War triggered extensive nationalization in Britain and Italy #expands (0.78) — Clara E. Mattei, The Capital Order, 188