A regime can combine nominal constitutional review with aggressive closure of the political arena

Evidence

In 2002, for example, a Parliament dominated by President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) passed a Suppression of Terrorism Bill that imposed dire penalties on violence or threats of violence for political, religious, or cultural ends, unlawful possession of arms, and publishing news “likely to promote terrorism.” The same year its Political Organizations Law barred formation and registration of new parties as it forbade existing parties to hold rallies, take part in elections, or open offices outside of Kampala, the national capital. Uganda’s Constitutional Court intervened against the law, but the NRM remained the only effective party-like force in Ugandan politics. (In 2005, the Ugandan Parliament compliantly revised the country’s term limits so that President Museveni could run for a previously barred third term.) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 497

Categorization

  • XREF: Direct datum for the reader’s question: institutional channels (Constitutional Court) existed but were toothless — relevant contrast to check institutional absorption defusing politicization. — connects to: Judicial review is the power of courts to strike down unconstitutional government actions. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1383; Political barriers can entrench laws as effectively as formal constitutional impediments do. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 184; Courts have the essential duty to interpret conflicting laws and constitutions — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 481 (+2 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 497

Broader Connections