Naming and categorizing contention shapes how authorities and publics respond

Evidence

Both revolution and riot illustrate these points clearly. Revolutions do not conform to general laws, but once someone has identified a proposed or actual turnover of governmental power as revolutionary, the identification has powerful symbolic significance, and participants’ actions provide models for would-be revolutionaries elsewhere. Similarly, the events people call ā€œriotsā€ result from a wide variety of conditions and causes. But labeling a crowd action as a riot authorizes repressive forces to intervene against the crowd. It also provides a possible model for future crowd action—depending on the reactions of authorities, observers, media, and members of the general public. In both cases, whatever causal coherence the contention displays does not reside in the distinctive character of revolutions and riots, but in the mechanisms and processes that produce political contention in general. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1342

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly relevant to reader’s framing question: labeling dominant-group violence as ā€˜rights defense’ vs subordinate-group action as ā€˜riot’ is exactly the asymmetry mechanism — naming authorizes different repression. — connects to: Naming systems rather than blaming individuals is the antidote to scapegoating politics — Naomi Klein, Doppelganger: A Trip into the Mirror…, 1073; Naming an adversary is itself a contested act of moral framing — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 2476; Challenging consensus triggers dismissal of the arguer rather than the argument — Mark Fisher (edited by Darren Ambrose), K-Punk: The Collected and Unpublished…, 2389 (+1 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1342

Broader Connections