Military seizure of power signals low regime capacity

Evidence

For another regime about which we already know something, we can turn to Uganda. There we learn that President Yoweri Museveni (who had seized power militarily in 1986) shook up his military administration in 1989. In fact, Museveni fired his own brother as army commander and replaced him with a reputedly incorruptible young colonel. But even that decisive move did not give the Museveni government secure control over all of Uganda’s territory. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 385

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Low-capacity, nondemocratic regimes rely on military force against armed challengers — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 388; High-capacity mobilization hits the regime directly while low-capacity contention rarely does; A regime controlling the security forces can still cede power peacefully in transition — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 86 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• High-capacity mobilization hits the regime directly while low-capacity contention rarely does #expands (0.85)
• High capacity and democracy suppress revolutionary situations while medium-capacity regimes favor outcomes #corroborates (0.82) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 979
• A regime controlling the security forces can still cede power peacefully in transition #complicates (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 86
• Contention-driven regime transformation remains an unanswered puzzle #expands (0.75)