State labeling of performances enables force and creates models for future action.

Evidence

A delicate problem arises at exactly this juncture. Even when they point to causally heterogeneous phenomena, everyday categories such as riot, disorder, disturbance, and terror have two kinds of significance for the analysis of regimes. First, the very labeling of a performance as one thing or another regularly has consequences for the participants. During the years of the Riot Act, authorities who called a worrisome assembly a “riot” assumed the right to use force against the assembled crowd. These days to identify a group as terrorist threatens that group’s very survival. … Second, whether or not authorities do the labeling, once a certain sequence of performances acquires a name and notoriety, it can serve as a model for subsequent performances. Even if not all members of the category involve the same causes and effects, once observers, participants, or authorities have labeled a sequence as a “revolution” or a “strike,” later contenders can draw on the model to say “We’re making a revolution” or “We’re striking.” — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 296

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s question about institutional absorption: labeling a subordinate-group act ‘terror’ authorizes state force in a way absent for dominant-group ‘rights defense’ — the asymmetry the reader wants to test lives exactly in this first kind of significance. — connects to: Naming heterogeneous demands performatively creates their unity. — Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 361; Observed consequences of modeled behavior drive viewers to adopt it — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 2830; People can will future actions indirectly by engineering external stimuli that trigger internal responses — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 229 (+4 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 296

Broader Connections