Democratization without capacity loss first raises then lowers collective violence.

Evidence

If many regimes democratize without losing capacity, we can expect short-run increases in collective violence as struggles for control intensify, followed by long-term declines in violent encounters. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 765

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 765
• XREF: connects to: Capacity loss in nondemocratic regimes raises collective violence, as in the post-1985 USSR. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 764; Higher regime capacity with some democratic freedoms produces intermediate contention — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 503; Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape the violence level of domestic contention — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 898 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape the violence level of domestic contention #expands (0.82) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 898
• Higher regime capacity with some democratic freedoms produces intermediate contention #expands (0.78) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 503
• High-capacity flawed democracies absorb electoral change without major violence #exemplifies (0.74) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 527
• Regime type determines the forms and intensity of collective violence #qualifies (0.72) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 689