Terror is a strategy of asymmetric violence deployable by weak or strong actors

Evidence

Terror, then, is not a single form of violence but a strategy: deployment of violence or threats of violence against a very unequal target. Terror’s inequality can run in either direction: a relatively weak political actor strikes against a very strong political actor, or a very strong political actor deploys violence and threats of violence against a relatively weak political actor. Terror matters politically when it dramatizes the target’s vulnerability. By doing so, it broadcasts a threat not only to the target but also to third parties that have allied with the target, depended on the target for protection, or occupied positions similar to the target’s. Terror therefore succeeds if it deters the target from acting in opposition to the perpetrators’ interest, but also if it drives third parties away from collaboration with the target. Many different sorts of political actors engage in this sort of asymmetrical interchange. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 828

Terror, then, is not a single form of violence but a strategy: deployment of violence or threats of violence against a very unequal target. Terror’s inequality can run in either direction: a relatively weak political actor strikes against a very strong political actor, or a very strong political actor deploys violence and threats of violence against a relatively weak political actor. Terror matters politically when it dramatizes the target’s vulnerability. By doing so, it broadcasts a threat not only to the target but also to third parties that have allied with the target, depended on the target for protection, or occupied positions similar to the target’s. Terror therefore succeeds if it deters the target from acting in opposition to the perpetrators’ interest, but also if it drives third parties away from collaboration with the target. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 828

Notice that a recurrent strategy of intimidation occurs widely in contentious politics, and corresponds approximately to what many people mean by terror: asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies. … Recognize that a wide variety of individuals, groups, and networks sometimes employ that strategy. … Connect the strategy systematically to other forms of political struggle proceeding in the same settings and populations. … Observe that violent specialists ranging from government employees to bandits sometimes deploy terror under certain political circumstances, usually with far more devastating effects than the terror operations of nonspecialists. … In short, locate terror in relation to regimes and repertoires, as an aspect of collective violence. The horrors of September 11 should not blind us to systematic variation in the character and origins of terror. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 885

Categorization

• DEFINE: Tilly redefines terror as a directional strategy of asymmetric violence, not a fixed actor type — a needed precision for the reader’s framework extension.
• XREF: Connects to the State Department analytical tradition of treating terror as a bounded category rather than an asymmetric strategy; also connects to the reader’s interest in how regime type shapes dominant versus subordinate violence. — connects to: Terror is best studied as one repertoire within regimes, not sui generis — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 889; High-capacity governments hold near-monopolies of terror but use it sparingly — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 892; A few terrorists will soon produce massive violence once were limited to the weak (+6 more)
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 828; Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 885

Broader Connections

• War against terrorism is itself a form of terrorism. #exemplifies (0.90)
• A few terrorists will soon produce massive violence once were limited to the weak #contradicts (0.80)
• Terrorism is defined by its extranormality and symbolic targeting rather than casualties #qualifies (0.72) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4070
• Terrorism is defined by attacking incidental third parties, not by ends or severity. #qualifies (0.72)
• Dominant groups use systematic terror most ferociously when subordinates challenge them #expands (0.72)
• Terrorism aims at political influence through emotional arousal rather than destruction #responds-to (0.70) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4067