Democratic high-capacity regimes vary remarkably in domestic contention despite controlling violence

Evidence

Considering all sorts of collective violence including civil war and terror, the most general relations run as shown below. All of these causal connections have by now become quite familiar. Even more so than earlier analyses, however, the study of collective violence brings out the importance of governmental control (or lack of control) over violent means. High-capacity, democratic regimes certainly have a capacity for violence. Even if they are less likely to fight each other, they engage in interstate war about as frequently as other regimes (Geller and Singer 1998; Gowa 1999; Hagan 1994; Olzak 2006; Ray 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). But on the domestic scene, their powerful combination of governmental control over violent means, widely available nonviolent repertoires, and accountability of government agents for their uses of force produce a remarkable variety of contentious politics. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 895

Categorization

• XREF: Central to the reader’s stated project: Tilly’s regularity that high-capacity democracies combine coercive control with nonviolent repertoires and agent accountability — the exact matrix the reader wants to stress-test for an asymmetry between subordinate and dominant politicization. — connects to: High-capacity regimes are likelier to involve state violent specialists in whatever collective violence occurs — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 737; Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape the violence level of domestic contention — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 898; Democratic high-capacity regimes exhibit distinctive patterned contention. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 378 (+4 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 895

Broader Connections

• Democratic high-capacity regimes exhibit distinctive patterned contention. #expands (0.88) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 378
• High-capacity regimes’ monopoly on coercion means their own agents dominate the violence that occurs #complicates (0.74) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 737
• Higher regime capacity with some democratic freedoms produces intermediate contention #qualifies (0.72) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 503
• High capacity and democracy suppress revolutionary situations while medium-capacity regimes favor outcomes #complicates (0.71) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 979