Institutions designed to divide subordinates instead create new arenas for struggle.

Evidence

Formation of a tricameral legislature in 1983, for example, did not split the nonwhite population as Premier Botha had planned, but it did provide a vehicle for dissident Asian and Colored allies of the excluded black population. Creation of homelands such as KwaZulu did not tame the African population, but it did establish a new arena for struggle between black resisters and collaborators. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 632

Categorization

  • XREF: This is strong contrary evidence against the reader’s hypothesis that institutional absorption defuses subordinate-group politicization - Botha’s tricameral legislature was meant to co-opt Colored and Asian groups, yet it became a vehicle for anti-apartheid allies. — connects to: Existing political institutions, not just pressure levels, shape contention. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 631; Judicial defeats often mobilize losing groups to shift their fight to other arenas. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 3120; Dominant groups build institutions that co-opt subordinates rather than merely repress them — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 667 (+7 more)
  • QUESTION: Does Tilly anywhere distinguish cooptive inclusion (tricameral legislature) from genuine rights-conferring institutional absorption? The 1983 tricameral was a hollow concession - worth asking whether real democratization, not sham inclusion, is the operative variable.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 632

Broader Connections