Ethnic and religious fragmentation do not predict civil war onset

Evidence

Despite their plausibility and popularity, the fragmentation measures did not survive multivariate testing; they showed only weak, inconsistent associations with civil war. The robust associations were the following: … Instability of governmental form (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 84) … Fearon and Laitin conclude reasonably that these conditions do not represent discontent or division in a national population. Previously existing grievances and ethnic or religious segmentation fall by the wayside. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 809

Categorization

  • XREF: Critically relevant: if subordinate-group politicization rises with institutional absorption, Tilly-side evidence here shows group division itself doesn’t drive violent contention — state capacity and instability do. — connects to: Civil war and terror are causally heterogeneous, not unitary phenomena — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 789; Ethnic and religious fragmentation weakly predict civil war; feasibility of insurgency does — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 809; Ethnic identity wars grew from half to three-quarters of civil wars across decades — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 704 (+4 more)
  • QUESTION: Tilly cites Fearon-Laitin against fragmentation as a driver; does this cut against the reader’s expectation that rights absorption defuses subordinate politicization, or just against ethnic-tension explanations?
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 809

Broader Connections