Political actors divide into members, challengers, and outside interveners

Evidence

We make a rough distinction among members, challengers, and outsiders: actors that have routine access to the government and each other, organized actors that are bidding for power but lack routine access, and outside actors (for example, the Chilean government, the Organization of American States, and the United States) that intervene in domestic politics without exercising routine membership. β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 126

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Member/challenger dichotomy is the load-bearing concept for testing the asymmetry: challengers lack routine access and bid for power, so institutional absorption would convert challengers into members β€” exactly the channel Tilly posits without testing asymmetrically.
  • XREF: Connects to Skocpol and the social-movement literature distinguishing insiders/outsiders; also echoes Olson’s insiders vs. entrants logic. β€” connects to: Regime shifts can selectively open opportunity to specific activist constituencies while excluding others. β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1175; Regime actors divide into members, challengers, and outsiders by access.; Political actors form through regimes rather than preceding them. β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 576 (+1 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim β€” Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 126

Broader Connections