Drug-transit wealth funds armed gangs capable of eroding democracy

Evidence

UNIP’s power had largely rested on indirect support from urban workers, which gave the unions a prominent position in Zambian politics. When the labor unions turned against UNIP in the late 1980s, individual political leaders held neither the networks nor economic power for mass mobilization (Cheeseman, 2006: 78). … The regime deployed paramilitary forces to townships, but there was no real attempt to use the security forces for UNIP’s purposes (LeBas, 2011: 217–218). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 83 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: U.S. covert wars seeded gangs that now supply its drug markets — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 313; Regime capacity to mobilize violence depends on patron-client networks and assets — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 83; The mob shifts allegiance opportunistically between political camps (+1 more)

Related

• Regime capacity to mobilize violence depends on patron-client networks and assets (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Regime capacity to mobilize violence depends on patron-client networks and assets #corroborates (0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 83
• Democratization, not state weakness, generated the true mafia #corroborates (0.73)
• U.S. covert wars seeded gangs that now supply its drug markets #complicates (0.72) — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 313
• The mob shifts allegiance opportunistically between political camps #complicates (0.72)