Political parties can be underwritten by warlords running local protection rackets

Evidence

Throughout much of KwaZulu and its areas of emigration, warlords who controlled their own enforcers played the classic game of indirect rule. Within their own territories, they recruited and disciplined migrant workers; operated protection rackets; benefited from monopolies of such commodities as beer; and collected a variety of payments from local merchants. Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party long enjoyed their financial, political, and (when needed) military support: The various warlords tend to join Inkatha because in KwaZulu this relationship is based on a quid pro quo-as a reward for being left alone and allowed to follow their own devices they will undertake to deliver a certain number of men for Inkatha rallies and also provide “soldiers” for any fighting that needs to be done. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 592

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 592
• XREF: connects to: Contemporary revolutions increasingly empower warlord governments rather than consent-based regimes — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1111; Politicians gain power by promising protection against imagined threats — Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet_ Global…, 329; Local warlords under apartheid played classic indirect-rule politics — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 592 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Local warlords under apartheid played classic indirect-rule politics #exemplifies (0.78) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 592
• Political parties benefiting from mafia support restrict the state legal apparatus against the mafia #expands (0.76) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 486
• Politicians gain power by promising protection against imagined threats #qualifies (0.74) — Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet_ Global…, 329
• Contemporary revolutions increasingly empower warlord governments rather than consent-based regimes #expands (0.72) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1111