Collective violence shifts with changing opportunity structures, not static conditions

Evidence

Once we have specified the relevant initial conditions, dynamic analysis begins. Peru’s terrain and population distribution changed little between civil war and turbulent semi-democratic politics, but POS and repertoire shifted significantly. Changes in the salience and coordination of collective violence, including the violence of civil war, result from alterations in the conditions and processes named in box 6.1: rising or falling uncertainty about the outcomes of claims, shifts in the stakes of achieving control over the government, exercise or disruption of brokerage, and so on. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 817

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supplies the causal mechanism the reader is seeking in Tilly: violence intensity varies with outcome-uncertainty and stakes of government control. Relevant to whether absorbing claims institutionalizes and thus lowers government-stakes-driven violence. — connects to: Regime type determines the forms and intensity of collective violence — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 689; Capacity loss in nondemocratic regimes raises collective violence, as in the post-1985 USSR. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 764; Entrepreneurship, polarization, and rising uncertainty drive violence escalation across a boundary — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 773 (+3 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 817

Broader Connections

• Entrepreneurship, polarization, and rising uncertainty drive violence escalation across a boundary #expands (0.78) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 773
• Counter-violence can prise open restrictive structures and create new possibilities #exemplifies (0.76)
• Adaptation capacity shapes whether socioeconomic change produces political violence #qualifies (0.75) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4345
• No simple direct relationship links socioeconomic change to political violence #corroborates (0.74) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4343