Revolutionary situation frequency declined across Europe despite escalating warfare scale

Evidence

The data show us three half-century high points of revolutionary situations, in descending order: 1642–91, 1792–1841, and 1892–1941. Each accompanied a burst of international warfare: the first an amazing proliferation of wars on the European continent, around the Mediterranean, and on the high seas; the second especially the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; the third a series of Balkan wars leading up to World War I. Although the scale of wars increased, the overall frequency of revolutionary situations declined from one high point to the next. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1060

Categorization

• QUESTION: The declining frequency of revolutionary situations under rising state capacity is direct empirical support for the absorption thesis but Tilly never separates dominant- vs subordinate-group contention.
• DEEPTHINKING: The paradox — scale of war rising, revolutionary-situation frequency falling — concisely embodies Tilly’s whole claim that regime structure, not pressure or violence, drives contention; dense enough to anchor the reader’s capacity-democracy matrix reading.
• XREF: connects to: European regions hosted revolutionary situations nearly a quarter of the time after 1492 — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 997; Regime structure determines revolutionary situation frequency and character — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1045; Consolidated states face far fewer revolutionary situations than founding regimes do — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1058

Broader Connections

• Regime structure determines revolutionary situation frequency and character #complicates (0.75) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1045