Regimes with capital substitute purchase for direct coercion of subjects

Evidence

Capital refers to tangible, transferable resources that in combination with effort can produce increases in use value, plus enforceable claims on such resources. Regimes that command substantial capital—for example, from rulers’ direct control of natural resources, itself often undergirded by coercion—to some extent substitute purchase of other resources and compliance for direct coercion of their subject populations. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 129

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes capital from coercion and commitment as one of three regime resources Tilly uses to build the capacity axis.
• XREF: Connects to reader’s framework question: capital as a substitute mechanism for direct coercion, meaning institutional absorption might operate through capital without state capacity being high. — connects to: Family protection substitutes for state protection at a steep price of submission — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 150; Alternative institutional arrangements can substitute for one another to produce the same outcome — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, 1657; Coercion can substitute for trust when freedom is restricted — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2725 (+10 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 129

Broader Connections

• Violence, values, interests, and personal bonds substitute for one another in enforcing cooperation. #expands (0.83) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2213
• Alternative institutional arrangements can substitute for one another to produce the same outcome #expands (0.82) — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts, 1657
• Coercion can substitute for trust when freedom is restricted #corroborates (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2725
• Identity functions as a substitute for the protection that stable orders once provided. #exemplifies (0.80) — Ivan Davidson Kalmar, Derek Penslar, Orientalism and the Jews, 769
• Securitized debt markets depend on familial obligations as collateral substitutes #exemplifies (0.79) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 258
• Family protection substitutes for state protection at a steep price of submission #exemplifies (0.78) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 150
• Law substitutes for trust where trustworthiness fails against endgame incentives #expands (0.77)
• Totalitarian rule replaces external coercion with domination from within each person #qualifies (0.76)
• Coercive government power depends on voluntary cooperation from many #complicates (0.76)
• Parliamentary rule institutionalized permanent voluntary consent from the urban class #exemplifies (0.75)
• Power functions through unexercised possible sanctions rather than actual coercion #complicates (0.74) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 621
• Cooperation can arise from cost-sensitive conditional dispositions, not just sanctions or altruism #qualifies (0.73) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 137
• Money and love codes neutralize direct power by separating sanctions #complicates (0.72)