End of external patronage turned Somali collaborators into combatants in an attrition war

Evidence

As it happens, David Laitin’s own analysis of the Somalian civil war (1989–92) supports just such an argument. The Soviet Union’s collapse ended the possibility for Somalian regimes to support themselves by playing off Soviet against U.S. aid; hence the parties who had been receiving payoffs for collaboration with the government entered a competitive situation. The competition resembled wars of attrition as often described in the biological, international relations, and industrial organization literatures: actors including the one that currently holds the advantage (controls what remains of the government) continue to fight their enemies despite diminishing means of supporting their own activity and paying off their followers. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 818

Categorization

• XREF: A concrete case where collapse of payoff structures (external patronage removed) threw former regime-collaborators into violent attrition competition — a sharp instance of the reader’s politicization-changes-with-institutions dynamic. — connects to: Somali nationalism burned out and clan divisions violently reasserted themselves — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 4; Former Italian Somali soldiers banded together and terrorized regions post-occupation — Abdi Ismail Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, 199
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 818

Broader Connections

• Former Italian Somali soldiers banded together and terrorized regions post-occupation #exemplifies (0.78) — Abdi Ismail Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, 199
• Somali nationalism burned out and clan divisions violently reasserted themselves #expands (0.74) — I.M. Lewis, I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali_ Nation…, 4