Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape prevailing contentious repertoires.

Evidence

With that fundamental specification, vignettes of contention and its control in the regimes of this chapter indicate that locations of regimes with respect to capacity and democracy do, indeed, significantly affect the repertoires of contention that prevail in those regimes. They do so for two main reasons: (1) rulers in different sorts of regimes apply characteristically different combinations of coercion, capital, and commitment to the definitions of prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden forms of claim-making; and (2) a regime’s cumulated experience with contention lays down a characteristically different structure of opportunity and threat for potential claimants. Repertoires meet regimes in collaboration and conflict. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 533

As our vignettes of 1989 indicate, contentious repertoires vary systematically by location within regime space. Morocco’s long war with the Polisario notwithstanding, struggles among autonomous military groups concentrate in the low-capacity, low-democracy quadrant. Figure 4.1 shows Peru as just exiting from the quadrant in 1989, as Túpac Amaru, Sendero Luminoso, and government-backed paramilitaries all start to withdraw from the public scene. The upper-left corner (high capacity, low democracy) includes regimes in which any public, collective claim-making occurs either within stringent limits imposed by the government or in niches that have somehow escaped governmental surveillance and control. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 427

Categorization

• DEFINE: Gives the mechanism linking regime position on the capacity-democracy matrix to repertoires: differential ruler mixes of coercion/capital/commitment plus opportunity-and-threat structure.
• QUESTION: Tilly maps armed conflict to low capacity + low democracy. Does his framework predict paramilitary violence tracks capacity loss? The reader’s asymmetry test hinges on where subordinate-group contention gets channeled here.
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 533; Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 427
• XREF: connects to: Regime change and contentious politics mutually shape one another — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 38; Democratic regimes channel contentious claims into prescribed institutional forms. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 447; Low-capacity nondemocratic regimes tolerate wide contentious claim-making. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 448 (+13 more)

Broader Connections

• A regime’s past path in capacity-democracy space shapes its contention practices. #expands (0.90) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 145
• Democratic high-capacity regimes exhibit distinctive patterned contention. #exemplifies (0.88) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 378
• Similar capacity-democracy positions still yield sharply divergent national repertoires #complicates (0.88) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1315
• Regime capacity and democracy jointly shape the violence level of domestic contention #expands (0.85) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 898
• High capacity and democracy suppress revolutionary situations while medium-capacity regimes favor outcomes #qualifies (0.75) — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 979