Revolutionary situations shift to weaker late-consolidating states after 1800

Evidence

Over the century following 1691, the frequency of revolutionary situations declined across Europe as the early consolidators strengthened their top-down controls. Then the French Revolution of 1789–99 provided a new model (and, temporarily, a new sponsor) of revolutionary mobilizations elsewhere on the continent. After 1800, the bulk of revolutionary situations arose in the Balkans, Hungary, and Iberia. During the twentieth century, struggles over Ireland brought revolutionary situations back to the British Isles. But revolution never again returned to its seventeenth-century peak. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1059

Categorization

• QUESTION: Useful for testing whether the reader’s asymmetry hypothesis holds: does this geographic shift track where regimes are coercive-but-low-capacity versus high-capacity? Tilly implies yes but doesn’t test subordinate vs dominant politicization.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1059
• XREF: connects to: Consolidated states face far fewer revolutionary situations than founding regimes do — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1058; European powers could not effectively colonize vast domains until the mid-nineteenth century — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism: A Critique of…, 53; Revolutions happen when governmental weakness unblocks pressures, not when they are blocked

Broader Connections

• Revolutions happen when governmental weakness unblocks pressures, not when they are blocked #expands (0.78)
• European powers could not effectively colonize vast domains until the mid-nineteenth century #qualifies (0.72) — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 53