Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of Prejudice_ Fifty Years after Allport

Yield

1039 of 2958 paragraphs kept (35.1%). Target for mining: 30%–50% — on target.

Pre-Assessment

I don’t recognize this specific author/book pairing — the listing looks like a metadata error, since Laurie Rudman is a social psychologist but she is not the author of “On the Nature of Prejudice” (that’s Gordon Allport’s classic 1954 book). This appears to be a title/author mismatch from a catalog; the “unknown author” and “unspecified” stance/purpose compound the uncertainty. Given Allport’s original is a foundational social-psychology text, if this were one of the many edited volumes honoring it, the yield would be mostly empirical/conceptual work on prejudice and intergroup relations (tests of Allport’s contact hypothesis, modern measures of bias, discrimination research). But I can’t confirm which book is actually in hand, so treat my confidence as low. I’d advise verifying the actual cover/edition before committing.

Reading Goal

Prioritizing: Factual Claims (Core empirical grounding — seek corroborating/updating empirical findings), Causal Relationships (Contact-theory mechanisms and causal claims are the focus of the reassessment), Contrarian or Surprising Claims (Actively seeking passages that contradict or unsettle existing contact-theory claims), Connection Points (Linking to existing vault claims on prejudice psychology is central) De-prioritizing: Definitional Content (Terms already established in prior thread; only salient redefinitions needed), Craft and Method (Empirical grounding task, not concerned with authorial technique), Inspiration and Speculation (Future-directed speculation not needed for empirical corroboration task)

Thesis

Allport’s antipathy-based definition blinded the field to benevolent and paternalistic forms of bias · ch. 0

Argument

  1. The cognitive revolution redefined prejudice as an attitude, sidelining emotion — ch. 0
  2. Role incongruity lowers evaluations without necessarily producing overt negativity toward high-status roles — ch. 0
  3. Allport’s influence traces partly to theoretical pluralism rather than a single model — ch. 0
  4. Advantaged groups face role-incongruity prejudice but rarely enter low-status roles — ch. 0
  5. Different negative emotions drive distinct types of prejudice and responses — ch. 0
  6. Prejudice often is role-context devaluation, not global negativity toward a group. — ch. 0
  7. Allport’s book organized the scholarly study of prejudice for 50 years — ch. 0
  8. Trait evaluation is context-dependent and flips with role fit — ch. 0
  9. Prejudice arises from role-context devaluation, not from negative attitudes alone — ch. 0
  10. Role incongruity explains prejudice without requiring hostility — ch. 0
  11. Solo group members stand out, attract attention, and get perceived stereotypically — ch. 0
  12. Allport’s internally contradictory views on prejudice powered his generative influence — ch. 0
  13. Works become foundational by synthesizing perspectives rather than championing one theory — ch. 0
  14. System-justifying prejudice protects dominant groups’ self-esteem, not subordinate ones’ — ch. 0
  15. Subliminal racial priming shifts judgments even among people low in prejudice — ch. 0
  16. Advantaged groups also face prejudice when mismatched to roles. — ch. 0
  17. Prejudice-reducing legislation re-educates the masses after the fact rather than converting them in advance — ch. 0
  18. Negative stereotypes block access to desirable roles because those roles demand positive attributes. — ch. 0
  19. Group membership salience shifts flexibly across contexts and individuals — ch. 0
  20. Stereotypes gain accuracy through socialization, which then justifies the existing social system — ch. 0
  21. Categorization inherently produces prejudgment that cannot be avoided — ch. 0
  22. Allport grounded prejudice in categorization, identification, and intergroup contact — ch. 0
  23. Social psychologists dropped accuracy from definitions of prejudice, keeping only negative attitude — ch. 0
  24. Prejudice does not require inaccurate or exaggerated stereotypes. — ch. 0
  25. Prejudice arises from perceived mismatch between group traits and roles — ch. 0
  26. Outgroup prejudice reduces to two basic judgments, warmth and competence — ch. 0
  27. Modern prejudice scales measure resistance to group role change, not simple antipathy. — ch. 0
  28. People can hold prejudices without any conscious awareness of them — ch. 0
  29. Fear of status loss triggers reflexive disparagement of others — ch. 0
  30. Perceived group competence is inferred directly from social status — ch. 0
  31. Emotional prejudice predicts discrimination, while stereotypes predict it only weakly. — ch. 0
  32. Allport rejected group-level theorizing and missed the social identity revolution — ch. 0
  33. Group stereotypes activate differently depending on the context viewed — ch. 0
  34. Social categorization is a normal, inevitable mental process underlying prejudice — ch. 0
  35. Category primes speed stereotypic word decisions automatically — ch. 0
  36. Outgroups are seen as homogeneous while ingroups are seen as varied — ch. 0
  37. Prejudice varies with context yet remains predictable from role requirements. — ch. 0
  38. Positive stereotyped traits become double-edged liabilities in incongruent roles — ch. 0
  39. Visible physical differences trigger assumptions of deeper underlying differences. — ch. 0
  40. Whether stereotypes cause or rationalize prejudice is still unresolved after fifty years of study — ch. 0
  41. Prejudice research is splitting toward neural and behavioral levels that complement each other — ch. 0
  42. Social groups make ideal scapegoats because of their permanence and stability — ch. 0
  43. Allport helped found the psychology society that now sponsors his own legacy awards. — ch. 0
  44. Paternalistic control is a more prevalent prejudice mechanism than outright exclusion — ch. 0
  45. All people harbor prejudice as a normal cognitive function — ch. 0
  46. Self-esteem enhancement explains short-term but not chronic outgroup derogation — ch. 0
  47. Allport’s book chapter structure set the field’s research agenda for fifty years — ch. 0
  48. Equal-status contact toward common goals reduces prejudice, enhanced by institutional support — ch. 0
  49. Perceived symbolic and tangible threats drive prejudice toward stigmatized groups — ch. 0
  50. Allport framed prejudice as a byproduct of normally functional cognition — ch. 0
  51. Intergroup conflict simultaneously activates all related prejudices. — ch. 0
  52. Recognizing gaps between one’s actual behavior and egalitarian ideals motivates change through compunction — ch. 0
  53. The IAT measures speeded positive-negative associations to status groups — ch. 0
  54. Even accurate group stereotypes are wrongly applied to individuals. — ch. 0
  55. Ingroup love extremes do not drive outgroup prejudice — ch. 0
  56. Intergroup contact reduces prejudice more strongly than prejudice drives avoidance of contact — ch. 0
  57. Category-based perception serves adaptation, explaining why bias is automatic and unacknowledged — ch. 0
  58. Role change alters stereotypes rather than stereotypes fixing roles immutably. — ch. 0
  59. Intergroup contact imposes a cognitive strain of self-regulation on prejudiced majority members — ch. 0
  60. Ingroup favoritism stems from projecting self onto ingroup, not from self-enhancement striving — ch. 0
  61. Those who profit most from exploitation actively propagate prejudice — ch. 0
  62. Who-said-what errors reveal that race and gender categories override individuality — ch. 0
  63. Benevolent paternalism can coopt minority-group members into their own subordination — ch. 0
  64. Visible cultural differences inevitably breed intergroup friction — ch. 0
  65. Shared knowledge of prejudice grants social permission to express bias — ch. 0
  66. Allport saw prejudice as normal cognitive byproduct, not instinctual destructiveness — ch. 0
  67. Behavioral discrimination persists even where attitudes lack textbook negative prejudice — ch. 0
  68. Negative overall stereotypes bar groups from prestigious roles lacking positive attributes — ch. 0
  69. Motivated observ ers perceive within-group variety while unmotivated ones rely on subtypes — ch. 0
  70. Automatic stereotype activation is controllable and context-dependent — ch. 0
  71. Targets of prejudice respond with active coping strategies rather than inevitable self-hatred — ch. 0
  72. Intergroup discrimination arises from ingroup favoritism, not outgroup hostility. — ch. 0
  73. Interracial interaction imposes cognitive self-regulation burdens on prejudiced whites — ch. 0
  74. Prejudice targets individuals whose group stereotypes clash with role requirements. — ch. 0
  75. Defining prejudice as antipathy blinds the field to paternalistic control forms — ch. 0
  76. Unchecked intergroup contact allows glib we-they generalizations to persist. — ch. 0
  77. Prejudice takes benevolent paternalistic forms that disadvantage groups without antipathy — ch. 0
  78. Women receive positive evaluations yet remain targets of discrimination — ch. 0
  79. The Nature of Prejudice shaped the reasoning behind Brown v. Board of Education. — ch. 0
  80. Prejudice functions as rationalized exploitation by those who gain most from it. — ch. 0
  81. Allport’s prejudice definition misses groups discrimination harms without antipathy — ch. 0
  82. Categorization renders outgroups more homogeneous and ingroups more varied — ch. 0
  83. Prejudice targets show diverse intropunitive and extropunitive coping responses — ch. 0
  84. Group conversation amplifies negative stigma-congruent impressions of outgroups — ch. 0
  85. White anxiety about appearing prejudiced can actually make their Black partners like them more — ch. 0
  86. People change their own attitudes when ingroup members behave inconsistently. — ch. 0
  87. Stereotype inaccuracy matters most during a group’s status transitions — ch. 0
  88. Some prejudices involve positive affect combined with low respect — ch. 0
  89. Bigot rationalizations read as ideology rather than irrational personality defect — ch. 0
  90. Situation-specific evaluations emerge from group-role congruity, not baseline attitudes. — ch. 0
  91. Prejudice flourishes even without overt antipathy toward its targets — ch. 0
  92. Allport’s individual-level focus missed the group-process revolution in prejudice research — ch. 0
  93. Allport integrated motivational and cognitive accounts of prejudice that later psychology split — ch. 0
  94. Whites often deny external causes for Black disadvantage without antipathy — ch. 0
  95. Benevolent sexism praises women within patriarchally defined roles — ch. 0
  96. Categorization processes facilitate the harm of prejudice — ch. 0
  97. Sexism challenges defining prejudice as antipathy — ch. 0
  98. Subgroups increase perceived variability and weaken stereotypes, while subtypes preserve them — ch. 0
  99. Prejudice mixes a rational kernel of role-fit perception with motivated irrationality — ch. 0
  100. Disguised and implicit measures confirm no overall negative evaluation of women — ch. 0
  101. Authoritarianism and SDO are ideologies, not psychopathologies — ch. 0
  102. Self-esteem threat spurs ingroup favoritism, but chronic low self-esteem does not — ch. 0
  103. Allport described ambivalent competence-warmth outgroup stereotypes despite defining prejudice as antipathy — ch. 0
  104. Prejudice stems from role-stereotype incongruity, not from exaggerated or inaccurate beliefs — ch. 0
  105. Accurate group stereotypes are misapplied to mismatched individuals as prejudice — ch. 0
  106. Stereotypes function as cognitive structures rather than mere descriptions. — ch. 0
  107. Disconfirming individuals are set aside as subtypes that protect the group stereotype — ch. 0
  108. Allport borrowed psychoanalytic themes while avoiding purely analytic explanations — ch. 0
  109. Shared goals with outgroup members motivate accurate, counterstereotypic perception — ch. 0
  110. Allport’s precedent located intergroup bias in ordinary cognition, not pathology — ch. 0
  111. Prejudice functions as a psychological crutch providing reassurance, guidance, and confidence — ch. 0
  112. Allport treated social categorization as normal and inevitable, not aberrant — ch. 0
  113. Prejudice arises from normal cognition, not abnormal pathology — ch. 0
  114. Role incongruity supplies raw material that motivated reasoning then exploits — ch. 0
  115. Threats to a person’s ingroup are experienced as threats to the self itself — ch. 0
  116. Situation-specific evaluations of group members are constructed, not merely retrieved — ch. 0
  117. Insecurity about one’s status triggers reflexive disparagement of others. — ch. 0
  118. Ingroup favoritism stems from projecting self-traits onto the ingroup, not distinctiveness striving. — ch. 0
  119. Dominant groups maintain advantage through affection-laced paternalism rather than hostility — ch. 0
  120. Social systems can enable change, and new roles redefine group stereotypes — ch. 0
  121. Allport already documented ambivalent and positive outgroup stereotypes — ch. 0
  122. Prejudice becomes visible and debated only when disadvantaged groups seek upward mobility — ch. 0
  123. Allport’s work is read as founding both cognitive and irrationalist theories of prejudice — ch. 0
  124. Self-hatred was only one of sixteen defenses Allport cataloged — ch. 1
  125. Allport held that violence escalates gradually from prejudgment and animosity — ch. 1
  126. Neuroscience tools were newly opening up prejudice research around 2003. — ch. 1
  127. Accuracy can be measured as how perceivers’ judgments correlate with group criteria. — ch. 1
  128. Hate speech both escalates prejudice and can cathartically release it — ch. 1
  129. Later theories prioritized intergroup comparisons with little empirical testing — ch. 1
  130. Categorical thinking also protects existing views from frequent revision — ch. 1
  131. Prejudice research ignored victims’ experience until the 1980s stigmatization turn — ch. 1
  132. Ingroup attachment does not necessarily produce outgroup hostility — ch. 1
  133. Frustration functions as an adaptive alarm signal motivating diagnosis of blocked goals. — ch. 1
  134. A fully developed personality handles suffering without inflicting it on others — ch. 1
  135. Spatial versus social segregation predicts whether stereotypes stay paternalistic or turn negative — ch. 1
  136. Allport underestimated backlash as a normal, not paranoid, response to prejudice-reduction — ch. 1
  137. Ethnic slur vocabularies vary in negativity, indexing derogation level of outgroups — ch. 1
  138. Overheard hate speech spreads prejudice to bystanders, not just targets — ch. 1
  139. Perceiving groups as natural kinds with essences drives sweeping stereotype generalization — ch. 1
  140. Blatant sexism scales fail to predict key gender outcomes — ch. 1
  141. Derogatory label use extends beyond ethnicity to any clearly categorized social group — ch. 1
  142. Contact research should start from the default prediction of prejudice reduction — ch. 1
  143. Allport’s four contact conditions were meant to operate jointly, not as separate variables — ch. 1
  144. Common ingroup identity is a consequence of contact, not just a catalyst — ch. 1
  145. Over 250,000 people across 38 nations were studied in contact-prejudice research — ch. 1
  146. No measurement strategy yields unbiased truth about individuals’ standing on trait dimensions — ch. 1
  147. Five African-derived qualities enable resilient adaptation to oppression — ch. 1
  148. Stereotypes elicit confirming behavior and perpetuate the status quo — ch. 1
  149. Positive contact changes attitudes but not stereotype content without disconfirmation plus typicality — ch. 1
  150. Racial group differences in self-esteem reverse the expected hierarchy — ch. 1
  151. Stronger group identification correlates near zero with ingroup bias — ch. 1
  152. Ego, group, and system justification are stereotypes’ three justificatory functions — ch. 1
  153. Allport argued ethnic slurs causally precede exclusion and violence toward groups. — ch. 1
  154. Social perception reduces to agentic and communal attribute dimensions — ch. 1
  155. Choosing one’s ingroup language over the outgroup’s is itself a form of ingroup bias — ch. 1
  156. Half a century later, many of Allport’s propositions remain untested — ch. 1
  157. Successful, competent minorities competing with the dominant group are the most likely scapegoats. — ch. 1
  158. Multiple group loyalties coexist when circles differ in scope — ch. 1
  159. Self-enhancement bias promotes mental and physical health and longevity — ch. 1
  160. Utopian promise, not just destructiveness, drives scapegoating movements — ch. 1
  161. Ingroup distancing protects well-being but feeds prejudice that worsens interracial relations — ch. 1
  162. Underlying causal theories about groups guide how stereotype-relevant information is interpreted. — ch. 1
  163. Scapegoating thrives because complex explanations fail to fulfill needs for control — ch. 1
  164. Perceived group competition drives strategically instrumental discrimination policies — ch. 1
  165. Allport predicted stereotype content is malleable but resists change because prejudice anchors it. — ch. 1
  166. Individual frustrations produce personal blame; group frustrations produce outgroup blame. — ch. 1
  167. Monopolistic categories make all group members interchangeable under least-effort thinking — ch. 1
  168. Allport catalogued ego-defensive responses to victimization across multiple domains — ch. 1
  169. Choosing an outgroup’s language is perceived as ethnic betrayal — ch. 1
  170. Political conflicts trigger renaming of everyday foods to signal ethnic hostility. — ch. 1
  171. Genocide targets economically successful middleman minorities across centuries — ch. 1
  172. Genocide is a top-down state-organized process, not a spontaneous outburst. — ch. 1
  173. Successful scapegoating campaigns can intensify rather than abate. — ch. 1
  174. Advantaged groups manufacture prejudiced justifications to protect their gains — ch. 1
  175. Prejudice is a group-level defense of privilege, not individual animosity. — ch. 1
  176. Benevolent stereotypes produce a backlash effect against agentic women — ch. 1
  177. Stereotypes validated through active reaffirmation resist contradictory evidence most strongly — ch. 1
  178. Realistic group conflict includes competition over belief systems, not just resources — ch. 1
  179. Kardiner and Ovesy held that every Black personality trait traces to hardship — ch. 1
  180. The approved minority coping strategy of hard striving can be physically harmful via hypertension — ch. 1
  181. Ideologies and situational threats mutually reinforce each other in producing perceived competition — ch. 1
  182. Activating one category suppresses competing stereotype categories — ch. 1
  183. Hate speech harm may flow through exclusion and violence rather than the words themselves — ch. 1
  184. Paternalism and individualism regimes produce different dominant stereotypes of subordinates — ch. 1
  185. Mere labeling of groups induces perceived intergroup differences even for neutral stimuli — ch. 1
  186. Allport treated his contact chapter as central, cutting little when abridging his book — ch. 1
  187. Backlash effects make women curb agency and depend on men for status — ch. 1
  188. Individuals differ reliably in chronic stigma consciousness, reconciling contradictory findings — ch. 1
  189. Stereotypic inaccuracy means overestimating real group mean differences — ch. 1
  190. Being a hate speech target harms emotional and physical health — ch. 1
  191. Attributing negative feedback to prejudice protects rather than damages self-esteem — ch. 1
  192. Positive stereotypes like ‘poor but happy’ legitimize inequality — ch. 1
  193. Contemporary research confirms most but not all of Allport’s target-response predictions — ch. 1
  194. Acceptance of groups is attainable even while acknowledging real differences — ch. 1
  195. Stereotyped trait clusters cohere only through an intuitive causal theory. — ch. 1
  196. Perceived value threat can convert into real resource competition over politics — ch. 1
  197. Perceived group unity arises from proximity, similarity, and interdependence cues — ch. 1
  198. Implicit beliefs that women are nice but weak suppress their advancement. — ch. 1
  199. Group slurs predict degrading caricatures of outgroups in children’s books — ch. 1
  200. Historically stigmatized group membership makes race-bias a chronically accessible frame for interpreting experiences — ch. 1
  201. Combat and housing desegregation reshaped racist attitudes across class and region — ch. 1
  202. Sex stereotypes prescriptively regulate behavior, not just describe it — ch. 1
  203. Favoring one’s own group does not require hating other groups — ch. 1
  204. The Brown decision’s damaged-self-esteem claim rested on the Clark doll studies — ch. 1
  205. Perceived group competition can motivate prejudice and discrimination directly. — ch. 1
  206. Cooperative jigsaw learning reduces prejudice in schoolchildren across nations — ch. 1
  207. Hate speech inflicts measurable psychological and physiological harm on its targets. — ch. 1
  208. Scapegoating can intensify, not subside, when it seems to succeed — ch. 1
  209. Allport believed real group differences exist but get distorted and weaponized by prejudice. — ch. 1
  210. Victim psychological responses depend on group historical-cultural coping patterns — ch. 1
  211. Correspondence between minority and majority acculturation preferences reduces intergroup conflict — ch. 1
  212. Ethnocentric biases arise even from trivial or random group assignments — ch. 1
  213. Intergroup attitude structures vary with the relationship’s contact patterns — ch. 1
  214. Cognitive fatigue increases reliance on stereotypes — ch. 1
  215. Prejudice victims’ personality orientation predicts whether their defenses are outward or inward — ch. 1
  216. Pejorative slurs toward immigrant groups predict real social exclusion — ch. 1
  217. Committing early harm spirals perpetrators into escalating violence via rationalization. — ch. 1
  218. Minority adolescents compare within their group more than across groups — ch. 1
  219. The form of violence reflects institutional structure, not underlying hostility. — ch. 1
  220. Visible group distinctions make people link personal needs to group status — ch. 1
  221. Perceived outgroup power plus malice lets mass murder self-justify as self-defense — ch. 1
  222. Stratified societies employ social and spatial distance mechanisms to maintain status boundaries — ch. 1
  223. In-group favoritism is not gendered but out-group hostility is — ch. 1
  224. Allport’s individual-hostility framing still dominates prejudice scholarship despite revisions — ch. 1
  225. System justification drives even disadvantaged groups to internalize inferiority — ch. 1
  226. Stereotypes function as cognitive shortcuts that conserve mental effort — ch. 1
  227. Cooperative pursuit of shared goals builds positive intergroup relations — ch. 1
  228. Prejudiced individuals misattribute their dislike to group attributes rather than vice versa. — ch. 1
  229. Small unfamiliar foreign outgroups get dehumanized in simplified ethnophaulisms — ch. 1
  230. Ethnophaulisms, ethnonyms, and antilocutions are distinct but related linguistic forms of group reference — ch. 1
  231. Prejudice toward women includes positive beliefs, not just antipathy — ch. 1
  232. Ingroup identification can moderate or mediate how deprivation produces prejudice — ch. 1
  233. Acute self-esteem threat, unlike chronic low self-esteem, activates stereotypes — ch. 1
  234. Allport’s ego-defense account missed dynamic individual-group connections — ch. 1
  235. Dominant-group stereotypes shift from categorical to probabilistic as ideology moves from paternalism to individualism — ch. 1
  236. Expertise in one domain does not prevent stereotyped thinking in others — ch. 1
  237. Scapegoat beliefs can be internally rational given culturally granted premises — ch. 1
  238. Allport doubted contact would reduce prejudice except under specified positive conditions. — ch. 1
  239. Stigmatized targets cope by compensating on alternative dimensions when stigma threatens an interaction. — ch. 1
  240. Hostile and benevolent sexism positively correlate in all cultures studied. — ch. 1
  241. Minority groups can themselves hold prejudice against women and other minorities — ch. 1
  242. Collective identity shifts personal goals toward the group’s welfare — ch. 1
  243. Disadvantaged group members often internalize negative stereotypes and favor outgroups in implicit attitudes. — ch. 1
  244. Chronic discrimination makes prejudice-target status a chronically accessible construct — ch. 1
  245. Prejudice partly stems from the need for positive social identity via group comparison. — ch. 1
  246. Allport’s optimal contact conditions facilitate but are not necessary for prejudice reduction — ch. 1
  247. Stereotype bias includes misjudging within-group variability, not just mean differences — ch. 1
  248. Scapegoats are powerful groups, not weak and vulnerable ones. — ch. 1
  249. People justify social hierarchy even when it harms their own group — ch. 1
  250. Categorization is an unavoidable cognitive basis for prejudgment. — ch. 1
  251. Different prejudice-reduction strategies may work sequentially rather than in competition — ch. 1
  252. Concealing a stigmatized identity causes more distress than revealing it — ch. 1
  253. Black Americans have lower lifetime depression prevalence than Whites — ch. 1
  254. Allport underrated avoidance as a form of harmful discrimination — ch. 1
  255. A dual identity reduces prejudice when it signals progress rather than threat — ch. 1
  256. Stereotype rationalizations are tautologically essentialist and self-contradictory yet retained — ch. 1
  257. Blaming the system rather than oneself can protect self-esteem — ch. 1
  258. Contemporary frameworks see prejudice effects as less inevitable than Allport did — ch. 1
  259. Transparent prejudice measures lose power as explicit bias declines socially — ch. 1
  260. Empirical research on how targets rebut ethnic slurs remains sparse and anecdotal — ch. 1
  261. Ingroup identification’s effect on prejudice depends on moderating factors like ingroup definition. — ch. 1
  262. Intergroup discrimination and violence stem from political self-interest rather than hostility — ch. 1
  263. Psychodynamic and frustration-aggression theories differ only in frustration’s source — ch. 1
  264. Dominant-group violence is deliberately calibrated to co-opt rather than alienate subordinates — ch. 1
  265. Blaming structural inequality for outcomes protects self-esteem in disadvantaged groups — ch. 1
  266. Equal perceptual error can mask sharply opposed attributions for group differences — ch. 1
  267. Perceivers bias group differences to favor their ingroup across attribute dimensions — ch. 1
  268. Men facing downward mobility displace frustration onto already deprecated minorities — ch. 1
  269. Assimilation and multiculturalism may each reinforce or constrain perceived intergroup competition. — ch. 1
  270. People seek a balance between uniqueness and belonging that breeds ingroup bias — ch. 1
  271. Some targets respond to prejudice with dignity without inflicting suffering in return — ch. 1
  272. Changing stereotypes without reducing hostility does little because stereotypes result from prejudice — ch. 1
  273. Ingroup favoritism operates independently of outgroup hatred — ch. 1
  274. Stereotypes persist both from cognitive limits and from identity-serving motivations. — ch. 1
  275. Allport repeatedly used ethnic slurs to illustrate points throughout his book — ch. 1
  276. Allport’s individual-level account missed culture’s role in victim responses — ch. 1
  277. Younger women self-restrict economically even more than older women do. — ch. 1
  278. Intergroup hostility is a product of structured interests, not fixed animosity. — ch. 1
  279. Modern sexism scales measure opposition to equality policies, not feelings about women — ch. 1
  280. No research yet establishes whether hate speech escalates into violence. — ch. 1
  281. Outgroups are not typically salient when people think about their ingroup — ch. 1
  282. Believing groups differ is harmless unless such beliefs justify prejudice — ch. 1
  283. Holding multiple group identities simultaneously shapes intergroup attitudes — ch. 1
  284. Ingroup identification only predicts bias under specific moderating conditions — ch. 1
  285. Benevolent prejudice explains why subordinates collaborate in their own subordination. — ch. 1
  286. Intergroup representations mediating contact and bias come in four distinct structural forms — ch. 1
  287. Dominant groups build institutions that co-opt subordinates rather than merely repress them — ch. 1
  288. Allport’s antipathy model missed how benevolence maintains subordinate groups’ lower status — ch. 1
  289. Stereotypes are illogical because they justify categories via circular essence attributions — ch. 1
  290. SDO and RWA predict prejudice through distinct threat perceptions — ch. 1
  291. African American perceivers held more negative views yet were more stereotyping-sensitive — ch. 1
  292. Believing in individual mobility makes low-status people deny their own victimization — ch. 1
  293. Groups genuinely differ yet their member distributions overlap considerably — ch. 1
  294. Allport arranged rejection into escalating stages from talk to violence — ch. 1
  295. Williams’s 1947 propositions anticipated Allport’s optimal-contact conditions — ch. 1
  296. Allport anticipated self-enhancement, identity content, and reference-group concepts now central to prejudice research. — ch. 1
  297. Perceived illegitimacy and impermeability drive low-status ingroup solidarity — ch. 1
  298. Black identity contains stable ideology and context-sensitive centrality dimensions — ch. 1
  299. Integration leads to better minority outcomes than other acculturation strategies — ch. 1
  300. Visible group distinctions make people attach personal needs to group status, fueling competition. — ch. 1
  301. Categories are mentally represented by idealized prototypical members — ch. 1
  302. Modern prejudice research rejects Allport’s assumption that targets internalize stigma — ch. 1
  303. Allport split target coping into extropunitive and intropunitive modes — ch. 1
  304. Judging stereotype accuracy presupposes defining group membership boundaries that are vague — ch. 1
  305. Intergroup contact effects differ by group so interventions need tailoring per relationship. — ch. 1
  306. Recent research links different conflict sources interactively rather than treating them as competitors — ch. 1
  307. Scapegoat beliefs reveal the perceiver’s faults or fears more than the target’s traits — ch. 1
  308. Stigmatized people compensate for devalued attributes by overperforming elsewhere — ch. 1
  309. Keeping group identities salient during contact improves generalization of positive feelings — ch. 1
  310. People confirm their initial stereotypes by biased attention and interpretation — ch. 1
  311. Contact effects are consistent across study, sample, and test analytic levels. — ch. 1
  312. Intergroup attributions differ in the abstractness of language used — ch. 1
  313. Structured group interests, not personalities, drive intergroup hostility — ch. 1
  314. Racism shapes target psychology as an ever-present accessible explanatory context, not just episodic events — ch. 1
  315. Words against a group can carry force equal to physical attacks for targets. — ch. 1
  316. Cultures approve of extra-effort coping among prejudice targets over other responses — ch. 1
  317. Allport held ingroup favoritism only weakly predicts outgroup hostility, unlike SIT — ch. 1
  318. Strong ingroup identification may increase intragroup focus rather than outgroup hostility — ch. 1
  319. Stereotypes are self-fulfilling prophecies that perpetuate the status quo endogenously — ch. 1
  320. Hostile and benevolent sexism target different subtypes of women. — ch. 1
  321. A target’s racial history stays psychologically present as situational context — ch. 1
  322. Dispersion inaccuracy means misperceiving within-group variability — ch. 1
  323. Prejudiced perceivers see outgroups as more homogeneous and more stereotypic than ingroups — ch. 1
  324. Minorities may bond with dominant groups through shared hatred of a common outgroup. — ch. 1
  325. Identification potency declines as group categories grow more inclusive but can be situationally revived — ch. 1
  326. Motivational factors in social judgment were neglected then rediscovered after Allport — ch. 1
  327. Categorizing people into groups minimizes perceived within-group differences — ch. 1
  328. Racelessness aids academic success but harms psychological well-being — ch. 1
  329. Negative factors inhibiting contact’s effect are the least understood theoretically — ch. 1
  330. Perceived low female agency forces women to disconfirm stereotypes to obtain leadership roles — ch. 1
  331. Antihomosexual prejudice among men correlates with secretly repressed homosexual arousal — ch. 1
  332. Stereotypes are real group differences magnified into negative caricatures by prejudice. — ch. 1
  333. Segregation serves dominants’ status maintenance, not an intermediate hostility phase — ch. 1
  334. Rejection sensitivity measured before college predicts later perceived racial events — ch. 1
  335. Integration yields best minority outcomes and marginalization the worst — ch. 1
  336. Prejudice victims can unknowingly justify the system that disadvantages them — ch. 1
  337. Stigmatized group members identify more strongly with their ingroup — ch. 1
  338. Selective perception and forgetting perpetuate false stereotypes over time — ch. 1
  339. Post-Allport theory made ideology, not frustration, the proximal cause of scapegoating — ch. 1
  340. Internet hate content recruits young members by appearing mainstream. — ch. 1
  341. Prejudice is best explained as rational resource expropriation by advantaged groups — ch. 1
  342. Allport saw derogatory language as both reflecting and causing prejudice along several paths. — ch. 1
  343. Victimized groups show mental health equal to nonvictimized groups — ch. 1
  344. People resist stereotype change by fencing off disconfirming individuals as exceptions. — ch. 1
  345. Pre-contact theorizing viewed intergroup hostility as a natural outcome of contact — ch. 1
  346. Social identity theory is a major post-Allport advance in prejudice research — ch. 1
  347. System justification makes victims unwittingly complicit in their own disadvantage. — ch. 1
  348. Devalued groups differ sharply in self-esteem across group lines. — ch. 1
  349. Intergroup discrimination is driven by rational self-interest and control, not hatred — ch. 1
  350. Occupational segregation persists partly through women’s own self-selection away from top positions — ch. 1
  351. Recategorizing group membership at more inclusive levels can undermine prejudice — ch. 1
  352. People spontaneously justify inequality without questioning the social system’s legitimacy — ch. 1
  353. Authoritarianism and social dominance are ideologies, not psychopathologies — ch. 1
  354. Allport held that prejudice inevitably shapes the personality of its targets — ch. 1
  355. Dominants sustain privilege through subordinate compliance that coercion alone would not secure — ch. 1
  356. Love of one’s ingroup drives intergroup bias as much as hatred of outgroups — ch. 1
  357. Collective frustration acts through ideology rather than directly causing aggression — ch. 1
  358. Equal-status workplace contact measurably improved racial attitudes — ch. 1
  359. Denying or concealing a stigma causes more distress than acknowledging it — ch. 1
  360. Perceived discrimination strengthens group identity only for those already highly identified with their group — ch. 1
  361. Ingroup bias rises when outgroups are similar and ingroup identification is strong. — ch. 1
  362. Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism together explain half of all prejudice — ch. 1
  363. Ingroup-favoritism mechanisms can be redirected to reduce outgroup bias — ch. 1
  364. Irrelevant info is repurposed to explain away stereotype-disconfirming deviance — ch. 1
  365. Accent and dialect differences reliably trigger ingroup bias independent of the speaker — ch. 1
  366. Stereotypes function as justification for inequality more than as accurate reflection of groups — ch. 1
  367. Dominants prefer affection and reasoning over hostility because compliance is cheaper — ch. 1
  368. Attributing disadvantage to systemic bias predicts positive self-esteem. — ch. 1
  369. Self-enhancement serves self-protection by reshaping environments or group standards — ch. 1
  370. Subgrouping a group reduces stereotyping while subtyping preserves it. — ch. 1
  371. Doll-test results depend on experimenter race and learning environment, not just damaged identity — ch. 1
  372. People derive self-worth from group membership and denigrate outsiders to protect it — ch. 1
  373. Allport’s prejudice framework largely ignored gender bias — ch. 1
  374. People resent low-status groups only when they defy traditional roles — ch. 1
  375. Decategorization and recategorization strategies reduce bias sequentially rather than competitively — ch. 1
  376. Stereotypes justify existing social arrangements and preserve the status quo — ch. 1
  377. Categorical thinking actively serves the perceiver’s self-interest, not just accuracy — ch. 1
  378. The mental health of discrimination victims equals that of nonvictimized groups — ch. 1
  379. No measurement method reveals a person’s true standing on trait dimensions — ch. 1
  380. Dominance requires relative rather than absolute resource advantage — ch. 1
  381. Group violence can erupt without any prior history of animosity — ch. 1
  382. Allport’s four optimal conditions are facilitating rather than necessary for contact effects. — ch. 1
  383. Dual identity reduces intergroup bias when subgroup identities are recognized and valued — ch. 1
  384. Group competition breeds prejudice while cooperative interdependence reduces bias — ch. 1
  385. Derogatory labels toward immigrants predict their social and economic exclusion — ch. 1
  386. Shared group-level frustrations, not individual ones, drive blame of outgroups — ch. 1
  387. Maintaining a stereotype against deviant evidence requires attentional resources people willingly spend — ch. 1
  388. Stereotypes can form by false association between rare events without any kernel of truth — ch. 1
  389. No systematic evidence links hate speech to actual violence yet — ch. 1
  390. Ingroup membership is a shifting, context-dependent self-definition tied to self-enhancement — ch. 1
  391. Implicit but not explicit stereotyping predicts backlash against agentic women candidates — ch. 1
  392. Romance functions as a power-achievement channel for women because agency is penalized — ch. 1
  393. Stigmatized groups sometimes show heightened sensitivity to subtle prejudice cues — ch. 1
  394. Prejudice does not uniformly lower targets’ self-esteem — ch. 1
  395. Allport’s tradition neglected group-level political constraints — ch. 1
  396. Perceived threat from a weak outgroup triggers anger; from a powerful one, fear — ch. 1
  397. Allport’s intrapsychic model missed multi-level identity dynamics — ch. 1
  398. Contact benefits fail to generalize when outgroup members are seen as exceptions — ch. 1
  399. Modern victim-based theories extend far beyond Allport’s ego-defensive account of prejudice targets. — ch. 1
  400. Formal institutional endorsement strengthens contact’s prejudice-reducing effects — ch. 1
  401. Intergroup contact reduces prejudice even beyond the groups involved. — ch. 1
  402. Essentialism serves to rationalize and justify rather than reflect group differences. — ch. 1
  403. Mere minimal group categorization alone triggers discrimination against outgroups — ch. 1
  404. Laboratory experiments cannot model genocide; archival analysis can — ch. 1
  405. Perceivers underestimate within-group variability, inflating perceived group differences. — ch. 1
  406. Perceivers exaggerate stereotypical group differences beyond what self-reports justify. — ch. 1
  407. Subordinates themselves carry out much violence against their own group — ch. 1
  408. Stigmatized people may use ingroup rather than mainstream standards for self-worth — ch. 1
  409. Post-Allport prejudice research incorporated political and group-interest determinants. — ch. 1
  410. Group identities serve functions beyond ego enhancement, which vary by group type — ch. 1
  411. People report liking women more than men because women are seen as more communal — ch. 1
  412. Groups differ by stable mean differences with individual variability around them — ch. 1
  413. Reducing prejudice requires qualitative social change, not individual fixes alone — ch. 1
  414. Researchers measure stereotype accuracy by comparing judgments to aggregated self-ratings — ch. 1
  415. Group labels are what make outgroups cognitively exist for perceivers. — ch. 1
  416. Attributing disadvantage to structural causes rather than personal character protects self-esteem. — ch. 1
  417. Awareness of a stereotype, not belief in it, impairs performance — ch. 1
  418. Allport devoted just one short chapter to prejudice’s effects on its targets — ch. 1
  419. Only groups perceived as powerful and hostile get scapegoated for frustrations — ch. 1
  420. Slur vocabularies’ cognitive complexity tracks how simplified outgroup mental representations are — ch. 1
  421. Stigmatized groups may base self-worth on noncomparative, noncontingent criteria — ch. 1
  422. Political interdependence between groups suppresses open hostility in inequality — ch. 1
  423. Prejudice targets show varied responses, including distancing and withdrawal, not only solidarity — ch. 1
  424. Later-stage racial identities serve empowerment rather than self-esteem repair. — ch. 1
  425. Low-status groups are less likely than envied minorities to be blamed as scapegoats. — ch. 1
  426. Knowing one belongs to a group differs from identifying with it — ch. 1
  427. Realistic conflict is a perceived group-level competition over collective consequences — ch. 1
  428. Symbolic value threats can convert into real resource competition between groups — ch. 1
  429. Research on scapegoating declined as psychodynamic theories fell out of favor — ch. 1
  430. Threatened self-worth increases outgroup derogation, which then restores self-esteem — ch. 1
  431. National identification breeds xenophobia only when framed comparatively against other nations — ch. 1
  432. Allport saw race loyalty versus one-world identity as history’s decisive clash. — ch. 1
  433. Dominants are driven by desire to control, not hostility toward subordinates — ch. 1
  434. Implicit measures reveal attitudes people cannot or will not report — ch. 1
  435. Stereotypes function as justificatory and screening devices, not mere category labels. — ch. 1
  436. Implicit chivalric romantic ideals reduce women’s career and income ambitions — ch. 1
  437. Downwardly mobile men displace aggression onto vulnerable minority groups — ch. 1
  438. Recruiting media helped the Internet radicalize young hate-group members — ch. 1
  439. Absence of hostility in unequal relations does not ease their human cost — ch. 1
  440. Cognitive laziness in categorization generates belief in group essences — ch. 1
  441. Benevolent paternalism toward subordinates perpetuates their own-group oppression — ch. 1
  442. A race-specific worldview buffers Black individuals against stress damage to well-being — ch. 1
  443. Allport dismissed sex discrimination as a rare male quirk — ch. 1
  444. People exaggerate an outgroup’s stereotypic traits and underestimate its diversity — ch. 1
  445. Intergroup emotion research grew markedly in the decades after Allport’s work. — ch. 1
  446. Archival records and laboratory experiments jointly reveal how hate speech functions — ch. 1
  447. Allport’s group-conflict framework foreshadowed modern group-dominance theories. — ch. 1
  448. Allport saw intergroup hostility as politically innocent and irrational — ch. 1
  449. Essentialist explanations transform social positions into natural and inevitable ones — ch. 1
  450. Ethnophaulisms predict the social exclusion of immigrant groups — ch. 1
  451. Individual stigma consciousness explains contradictory hypersensitivity findings — ch. 1
  452. Perceived entitativity of a group shapes stereotyping and member interchangeability — ch. 1
  453. Discrimination forms shift with the labor and housing structure — ch. 1
  454. Scapegoat targets are pre-chosen by envious stereotyping of powerful outgroups — ch. 1
  455. Categorization reduces uncertainty at a predictable cost to accuracy — ch. 1
  456. Apparent hypersensitivity may actually be accurate perception of prejudice — ch. 1
  457. The doll studies’ method of measuring racial identity was imprecise — ch. 1
  458. Only one of sixteen ego-defenses Allport described was self-hatred — ch. 1
  459. Envious prejudice exaggerates a target group’s power rather than disparaging its competence. — ch. 1
  460. Rational subordinates enforce dominants’ violence on their own group — ch. 1
  461. Favorable group comparisons can increase rather than reduce expressed prejudice — ch. 1
  462. Right-wing authoritarians and religious fundamentalists disproportionately express prejudice toward outgroups — ch. 1
  463. Ingroup love is more fundamental to human life than outgroup hate. — ch. 1
  464. Meta-analysis pools all studies to estimate effect sizes and moderators — ch. 1
  465. Venting verbal hostility increases rather than reduces subsequent aggression. — ch. 1
  466. Stereotypes serve three distinct justification functions beyond individual motives — ch. 1
  467. Prejudice’s psychological harm is now seen as conditional rather than inevitable. — ch. 1
  468. Agentic women face backlash penalties that identical male counterparts do not — ch. 1
  469. Genocidal killing sprees are driven by blaming an outgroup for one’s own misfortunes. — ch. 1
  470. Prejudice motivates perceived group differences rather than emerging from them — ch. 1
  471. Providing group information alone cannot change stereotypes — ch. 1
  472. Shared prejudice threats build protective ingroup solidarity — ch. 1
  473. People form false stereotypes without any kernel of truth — ch. 1
  474. Ethnic slurs reveal how simply the brain represents different outgroups — ch. 1
  475. Societies that prize equal opportunity and mobility breed intergroup competition and animosity — ch. 1
  476. Ingroup preference psychologically precedes outgroup hostility, which stems from other sources. — ch. 1
  477. Scapegoat theory fails on at least seven distinct empirical and logical grounds — ch. 1
  478. Perceptual inaccuracy in group perception indicates manipulation of social reality — ch. 1
  479. Fifty years passed without direct empirical tests of Allport’s antilocution claims. — ch. 1
  480. Abstract language describes ingroup virtues and outgroup vices as stable traits — ch. 1
  481. Targets can offset discrimination’s harm by either embracing or rejecting their group — ch. 1
  482. A cocktail-party cartoon launched the individual-difference measure of sexism — ch. 1
  483. Perceived power, not weakness, makes minorities likeliest to be scapegoated — ch. 1
  484. Aggressive impulses target innocent substitutes when the real frustrator is powerful — ch. 1
  485. Allport defined prejudice as antipathy rooted in faulty inflexible generalization — ch. 1
  486. Prejudice targets often downplay rather than exaggerate personal discrimination — ch. 1
  487. Stigmatized people protect self-esteem by unlinking it from prejudiced feedback. — ch. 1
  488. Reducing animosity may eventually shrink exaggerated stereotypes. — ch. 1
  489. Categorization both enables judgment and necessarily biases it — ch. 1
  490. Allport held that victimization can yield protective rather than pathological traits — ch. 1
  491. Future prejudice research should integrate cognitive limits with motivational self-interest. — ch. 1
  492. Evidence on minority-to-minority prejudice is mixed and understudied — ch. 1
  493. Allport reframed stereotyping as functional information processing rather than pathology. — ch. 1
  494. Allport held that prejudice, not categorization, is the fundamental driver of intergroup harm. — ch. 1
  495. Stereotypes map onto warmth and competence, which predict specific emotional responses. — ch. 1
  496. Categorization itself is not the problem; prejudice drives stereotypes, not vice versa. — ch. 1
  497. Perceived conflict activates pre-existing prejudices tuned to the same issue — ch. 1
  498. Plain ethnic labels have derogatory higher-key counterparts that signal rejection — ch. 1
  499. Shared frustration triggers a collective search for explanations and solutions — ch. 1
  500. Ingroup use of derogatory outgroup names increases hostile prejudice in bystanders. — ch. 1
  501. White support for racial equality rose while Allport-style prejudice supposedly eroded — ch. 1
  502. Most prejudice research still cites Allport even when challenging his claims — ch. 1
  503. People compare with their ingroup over time more than with outgroups — ch. 1
  504. Awareness of mortality drives people to defend cultural worldviews that give life meaning. — ch. 1
  505. Targets of prejudice balance self-protection and self-enhancement motives — ch. 1
  506. Outgroups only become cognitively real once we label them — ch. 1
  507. Economic upheaval and war threats inflate perceived competition between groups — ch. 1
  508. Stereotype-driven perception selectively confirms rather than tests its guiding hypothesis — ch. 1
  509. People exaggerate real group differences more for outgroups than ingroups — ch. 1
  510. Hatred-as-cause explanations of violence extended widely beyond Allport — ch. 1
  511. Groups seen as competing with the ingroup are stereotyped as low in warmth — ch. 1
  512. Group differences in coping with prejudice follow perceived controllability of the stigma — ch. 1
  513. Correlational accuracy measures cannot reveal over- or underestimation direction. — ch. 1
  514. Majority groups hold their own preferences about minority acculturation — ch. 1
  515. Symbolic threat and material conflict feed each other to sustain group boundaries — ch. 1
  516. Scapegoat theory’s problems remained unresolved for decades after Allport — ch. 1
  517. Prejudice reduction may not require eliminating perceived group differences — ch. 1
  518. African American responses to racism trace to African cultural origins adapted over time — ch. 1
  519. Intergroup attitudes must be studied as dynamic two-way exchanges, not unilateral outputs. — ch. 1
  520. Close intergroup contact can sustain inequality through paternalistic affection rather than reduce it — ch. 1
  521. Allport focused on immediate situational causes and doubted contact would generally reduce prejudice. — ch. 1
  522. Mid-century prejudice theory treated ethnic hostility as projected inner strivings — ch. 1
  523. Privileged castes selectively endorse essentialism that justifies privilege — ch. 1
  524. Genocide requires widespread difficult life conditions, not mundane frustrations — ch. 1
  525. Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception — ch. 1
  526. Beauty standards make women self-inflict bodily injury through intramural competition — ch. 1
  527. Intergroup contact reduces prejudice only under four specific optimal conditions. — ch. 1 └─ #qualifies-own → Allport’s optimal contact conditions facilitate but are not necessary for prejudice reduction
  528. Allport treated slurs as central despite devoting little page space to language — ch. 1
  529. Benevolent sexism blocks women’s advancement despite appearing favorable. — ch. 1
  530. Authoritarian prejudice stems from ideology-backed threat vigilance, not psychodynamic displacement. — ch. 1
  531. Perceived intergroup competition comprises cognitive, affective, and motivational components — ch. 1
  532. Minority students with dual identities show more positive intergroup attitudes than assimilationists. — ch. 1
  533. Recategorization into a common identity, not cooperation itself, reduces intergroup bias — ch. 1
  534. Resource-advantaged groups coordinate to create institutions expropriating from the disadvantaged — ch. 1
  535. The drive for positive self-identity fuels favorable ingroup comparisons — ch. 1
  536. Slurs can both escalate and relieve hostile prejudice toward a group — ch. 1
  537. Prejudice’s effect on targets is situation-dependent rather than personality-altering — ch. 1
  538. Dominants adopt individualism rhetoric once paternalism’s group order is challenged — ch. 1
  539. Gender prejudice research began with a 1972 study on liking competent women — ch. 1
  540. Fighting alongside Black soldiers at the Bulge changed White soldiers’ racial attitudes — ch. 1
  541. Categorization enables thought but inevitably blurs the individual features it generalizes. — ch. 1
  542. Contact effects are largest for sexual orientation, exceeding racial and ethnic groups. — ch. 1
  543. Intergroup bias and perceptual sensitivity can coexist within the same perceivers. — ch. 1
  544. Prejudice targets show self-hate only on implicit, not explicit, measures — ch. 1
  545. Benevolent and hostile sexism positively correlate worldwide — ch. 1
  546. Scapegoating thrives where complex causes resist clear attribution — ch. 1
  547. Prejudice motivates exaggerated group differences, not the reverse. — ch. 1
  548. Contact research spans 250,493 respondents across 38 nations — ch. 1
  549. Physical violence is a routine structural tool of inequality, not uncontrolled animosity — ch. 1
  550. Implicit attitude measures reveal prejudice explicit self-reports miss — ch. 1
  551. Identity functions vary across groups and explain differing identification-bias correlations. — ch. 1
  552. Categorization alone cannot produce prejudice without cultural justification — ch. 1
  553. Allport missed system justification as a stereotype motive distinct from ego and group justification — ch. 1
  554. Ethnic slurs range from benign to extremely derogatory across groups — ch. 1
  555. Identical behaviors are cognitively encoded differently depending on group membership — ch. 1
  556. Prejudice follows correlated status cues, not racial markers themselves — ch. 1
  557. Dual identity generalizes contact benefits because subgroup links stay intact — ch. 1
  558. Dominant groups shift from paternalistic affection to reasoned persuasion once segregation breaks intimacy — ch. 1
  559. Prejudice victims may become either more or less prejudiced than average against others — ch. 1
  560. Intergroup violence is routine institutional control, not uncontrolled hostility — ch. 1
  561. Ideologies and situations jointly trigger perceived group competition, requiring an outgroup — ch. 1
  562. Suppressing stereotypes paradoxically makes them more accessible later — ch. 1
  563. Overheard slurs spread prejudice to passive bystanders, not only targets — ch. 1
  564. Perceptual grouping of people enables but does not cause prejudice — ch. 1
  565. Low-prejudice people suppress stereotypes without suffering rebound effects. — ch. 1
  566. Role expectations derived from gendered social roles sustain agency as a male-associated trait — ch. 1
  567. Categories require an intuitive theory linking features, not just shared similarities — ch. 1
  568. Social identification peaks in groups of intermediate size balancing two opposing needs — ch. 1
  569. Prejudicial ideologies arise after exploitation, to justify it, not before — ch. 1
  570. Racism targets deploy self-protective and self-enhancing motivational systems — ch. 1
  571. Recategorizing group boundaries can expand ingroup identity from us-them to we — ch. 1
  572. Patriotism as critical regard for country can presumably be separated from chauvinistic nationalism. — ch. 1
  573. Stigmatized individuals protect self-esteem by disengaging from feedback in negatively stereotyped domains — ch. 1
  574. Ingroup ambivalence among disadvantaged groups rises as system-justification tendencies increase. — ch. 1
  575. Paternalism governs long-term inequalities through social rewards rather than force — ch. 1
  576. Ingroup attachment strength declines as category size grows, though context can reverse this. — ch. 1
  577. Allport reduced intergroup harm to individual animosity with no rational basis — ch. 1
  578. Groups are scapegoated for perceived power, not weakness — ch. 1
  579. Group dominance involves competition for moral hegemony, not just material resources. — ch. 1
  580. Allport’s individualist view of prejudice still dominates the field — ch. 1
  581. Stereotypes rationalize planned as well as committed discrimination — ch. 1
  582. Equal-status, purposeful, community-sanctioned contact best reduces prejudice. — ch. 1
  583. Empirically estimating stereotype accuracy requires knowing groups’ actual trait distributions. — ch. 1
  584. Prejudice is a cultural mechanism protecting dominant groups’ privileges — ch. 1
  585. Groups reduce competition by derogating outgroups, enhancing ingroups, or avoiding the competitor — ch. 1
  586. Scapegoating targets resented minorities perceived as powerful, not vulnerable ones. — ch. 1
  587. Antilocution research on the prejudice-violence escalation remains empirically underexamined. — ch. 1
  588. Genocidal movements attract followers through utopian promises, not hatred alone. — ch. 1
  589. Cultural individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational orientation moderate the identification-bias link. — ch. 1
  590. Speaking aggressive verbs increases actual aggression toward a peer — ch. 1
  591. Individual and collective prejudice processes have distinct causes — ch. 1
  592. Accurate stereotypes of real group differences are not prejudice — ch. 1
  593. Safe contexts free stigmatized individuals to shift from self-protection to self-enhancement — ch. 1
  594. Forcing colorblindness or identity forsaking backfires and worsens intergroup relations — ch. 1
  595. Blatant racism has shifted into subtle aversive forms — ch. 1
  596. Successful competing minorities, not weak out-groups, become primary scapegoats — ch. 1
  597. Hardship-driven need frustration is what scapegoat movements exploit. — ch. 1
  598. Frustration functions as adaptive pain signaling goal blockage — ch. 1
  599. Allport rejected the premise that prejudice harmfully affects all its targets uniformly — ch. 1
  600. Believing a category is a natural kind licenses strong inferences and immutability. — ch. 1
  601. Positive complementary stereotypes actually increase support for the status quo — ch. 1
  602. Rejecting all group stereotypes erroneously implies all groups are identical — ch. 1
  603. Authoritarianism and social dominance are socialized, culturally varying belief systems. — ch. 1
  604. Correlational accuracy measures sacrifice directional information about stereotype errors. — ch. 1
  605. A common group identity mediates contact’s bias reduction rather than merely aiding it — ch. 1
  606. Perceived resource scarcity combined with a competitive outgroup triggers instrumental prejudice. — ch. 1
  607. Humans cannot think without categorizing; even open-mindedness requires old categories. — ch. 1
  608. Broadening the definition of ingroup reduces intergroup bias — ch. 1
  609. Categorization is an unavoidable prerequisite for all human thought — ch. 1
  610. Perceiving group differences is not itself prejudice, only biased perception of them is — ch. 1
  611. Laboratory power-differential experiments can isolate structural causes of intergroup behavior. — ch. 1
  612. Ingroup cohesion need not produce outgroup hostility; hostility has separate sources. — ch. 1
  613. Disadvantaged group members internalize the same stereotypes advantaged groups hold — ch. 1
  614. Allport’s four contact conditions were adopted to explain inconsistent contact outcomes — ch. 1
  615. Intergroup ideological shifts reflect strategic rationality, not irrational animosity — ch. 1
  616. Scapegoats are chosen for perceived power, not vulnerability. — ch. 1
  617. Allport rooted prejudice in irrational person-based antipathy, not political motives — ch. 1
  618. Overly punitive parenting produces an internal conflict that fuels later scapegoating — ch. 1
  619. High category salience during contact boosts its prejudice-reducing effects — ch. 1
  620. People can belong to one group while desiring affiliation with another. — ch. 1
  621. Both Allport and Social Identity Theory require minimal ingroup identification for bias — ch. 1
  622. Real intergroup conflicts become magnified by layered-on prejudice distinct from their cause. — ch. 1
  623. Intergroup contact studies grew steadily across each decade since 1960 — ch. 1
  624. Lowered anxiety mediates about a quarter of contact’s prejudice reduction — ch. 1
  625. Strong ingroup identification need not produce outgroup derogation and may heighten intragroup focus instead. — ch. 1
  626. Early contact studies showed northern students acquiring racist attitudes at segregated southern schools — ch. 1
  627. Only three of nine original authoritarian traits form a coherent dimension — ch. 2
  628. Allport estimated that conformity alone underlies roughly half of all prejudiced attitudes — ch. 2
  629. Publication bias inflates the apparent effectiveness of prejudice-reduction programs — ch. 2
  630. Rokeach’s dogmatism theory aimed to capture authoritarianism of either political flank — ch. 2
  631. Suppressing prejudice begins preconsciously via an automatic conflict detection system in the brain. — ch. 2
  632. Quest-scale religiosity correlates negatively with prejudice even covertly measured — ch. 2
  633. Cold War socialist rivalry once pressured American racial equality, but that pressure is gone — ch. 2
  634. Pity toward disadvantaged groups can reinforce inequality by implying incompetence. — ch. 2
  635. Psychoanalysts themselves never reached consensus on what projection is — ch. 2
  636. The F scale failed to detect left-wing authoritarianism like communism — ch. 2
  637. Quest’s tolerance link may reflect a general openness disposition rather than religion — ch. 2
  638. School contact effects on prejudice always depend on child age and identity — ch. 2
  639. Only people with internalized nonprejudiced standards feel guilt over their actual prejudiced responses — ch. 2
  640. White Americans’ racial behavior is now formally egalitarian though still marginally discriminatory. — ch. 2
  641. Americans internalize contradictory pro- and anti-prejudice norms simultaneously. — ch. 2
  642. Rigid cognitive style drives authoritarianism but not prejudice directly — ch. 2
  643. Stereotype research often measures perceived societal reaction rather than personal emotion. — ch. 2
  644. Post-1954 cognitive research treated stereotyping as a byproduct of simplifying social information — ch. 2
  645. Perspective-taking reduces bias by transferring self-attributes onto outgroup members. — ch. 2
  646. People alternately vacillate between egalitarian values and prejudiced beliefs — ch. 2
  647. Group members resist surrendering meaningful category identities during intergroup contact — ch. 2
  648. Intrinsic religiosity suppresses only the specific prejudices a religion prohibits — ch. 2
  649. Whites accept individual inequality but reject group-based inequality — ch. 2
  650. Hatred can be personality-driven and detached from any real threat — ch. 2
  651. Allport’s contact chapter anticipated the three main post-1980 contact models — ch. 2
  652. Empathy and perspective-taking already anchored Allport’s account of prejudice reduction. — ch. 2
  653. Survey responses diverged from actual behavior after anti-prejudice norms took hold. — ch. 2
  654. Group identity itself can directly trigger emotional reactions — ch. 2
  655. White racial politics today are driven by antagonism toward Blacks, not White identity pride — ch. 2
  656. Symbolic racism has survived empirical tests of its critiques — ch. 2
  657. Today’s intergroup programs match Allport’s designs but their evaluations fall short — ch. 2
  658. Personal prejudices reflect prevailing social norms almost perfectly — ch. 2
  659. Open dominance beliefs survive only among those with old-fashioned racism — ch. 2
  660. Situational threat raises authoritarianism while inequality raises social dominance — ch. 2
  661. Conformity forms the core of most people’s prejudices — ch. 2
  662. Apparent personality traits often reflect attempts to conform to local norms — ch. 2
  663. Understanding religion-prejudice links requires specifying the type of religion involved — ch. 2
  664. Personalized friendships with outgroup members may fail to change attitudes toward the whole group. — ch. 2
  665. Allport anticipated whether group salience matters in intergroup contact — ch. 2
  666. Empathy is a vicarious emotional state produced by perspective-taking — ch. 2
  667. Allport held that demagogic propaganda activates latent authoritarianism into prejudice — ch. 2
  668. True prejudice reduction requires awareness of the values-action conflict — ch. 2
  669. Perspective-taking merges self and other, making self-traits project onto the target — ch. 2
  670. Prejudice persists because it serves psychological functions, not merely misperception — ch. 2
  671. Intergroup anxiety arises from innocent causes like ignorance, not racism — ch. 2
  672. Historical and political factors shape norms that determine racial attitudes — ch. 2
  673. Ingroup identity salience is historically contingent, not psychologically fixed — ch. 2
  674. Low-prejudice people reduce automatic bias by learning to associate failures with guilt and self-regulation — ch. 2
  675. Intrinsic religiosity tracks whatever prejudice one’s religion endorses, for or against. — ch. 2
  676. Anti-prejudice programs can successfully target institutional rather than only individual bias. — ch. 2
  677. Isolated extremist groups can develop and maintain prejudices despite national norms. — ch. 2
  678. Self-disclosure reduces prejudice by trading rarer, higher-value information — ch. 2
  679. Brown v. Board coincided with Allport’s book publication year — ch. 2
  680. Reducing existing prejudice requires countering confirmation-biased information processing — ch. 2
  681. Extrinsic religion serves nonreligious ends while intrinsic religion is an end in itself — ch. 2
  682. The F scale collapsed once item acquiescence was statistically controlled — ch. 2
  683. Allport’s threat-based account of authoritarianism beat Adorno’s repressed-aggression account empirically — ch. 2
  684. Behavior-evaluation gaps in prejudice may reflect age-related cognitive control shifts — ch. 2
  685. Social dominance orientation measures preference for group hierarchy over equality — ch. 2
  686. Adopting nonprejudiced values is only the first step in reducing prejudice — ch. 2
  687. Old-fashioned racism gave way to subtler forms that still shape political outcomes — ch. 2
  688. Overly strict criteria defined defensive projection out of empirical existence — ch. 2
  689. Children infer prejudice from observed social regularities even without overt parental bias — ch. 2
  690. Allport catalogued specific psychological defenses for resolving egalitarian-racist conflict. — ch. 2
  691. Allport downplayed government complicity in American racial caste despite official segregation — ch. 2
  692. Prejudice researchers still study perception more than motivated antipathy — ch. 2
  693. Peers who counter prejudice are more effective than adults at changing peer-group norms — ch. 2
  694. Unobtrusive measures reveal more racial bias than explicit self-reports do — ch. 2
  695. Shared group membership alone can trigger emotional reactions to others’ harm — ch. 2
  696. Authoritarian personality research declined due to methodological and psychometric flaws — ch. 2
  697. Conformity to social norms persists because deviance carries individual and social costs — ch. 2
  698. Religious groups split prejudice into forbidden and encouraged categories — ch. 2
  699. Allport and Adorno diverged on what core drives authoritarian prejudice — ch. 2
  700. Antibias interventions only work when matched to developmental readiness — ch. 2
  701. Adopting egalitarian beliefs does not erase automatically activated cultural stereotypes — ch. 2
  702. Batson reframed extrinsic and intrinsic religion as means and ends orientations — ch. 2
  703. Belief-formation impact of others depends on their persuasiveness, proximity, and number. — ch. 2
  704. Affective factors, not knowledge gain, drive contact’s prejudice-reducing effect — ch. 2
  705. Localized communication clusters sustain cultural diversity of beliefs within a larger society — ch. 2
  706. Prejudice is acquired through learning, conformity, and intergroup contact — ch. 2
  707. Partial-correlation adjustment can destroy the construct being measured — ch. 2
  708. Intrinsic religion robustly predicts lower prejudice across 32 studies of religious activity — ch. 2
  709. Symbolic racism is not reducible to political conservatism — ch. 2
  710. Manipulating social consensus can reduce prejudice — ch. 2
  711. Authoritarianism and conservatism arise from needs to manage uncertainty and threat — ch. 2
  712. Repressors project their denied traits onto others more than nonrepressors — ch. 2
  713. Prejudice theory abandoned emotion when it shifted focus from extreme bigots to normal people — ch. 2
  714. Children only form ingroup bias from categories when adults make them functional — ch. 2
  715. Experimental threat raises authoritarianism by shifting worldview, not dominance. — ch. 2
  716. Rigid cognitive styles correlate with conservatism but are not causally responsible for prejudice — ch. 2
  717. Intergroup programs should recur lifelong and adapt to local conditions — ch. 2
  718. Guilt is presumed to motivate people to control their prejudiced responses — ch. 2
  719. Regional attitude gaps refute personality explanations for prejudice — ch. 2
  720. Diversity training improves outgroup attitudes only weakly, especially for dominant groups. — ch. 2
  721. Low-prejudice people learn to inhibit prejudice by associating failures with guilt and self-regulatory cues. — ch. 2
  722. People feel emotional distress over harms to others merely sharing one salient group membership — ch. 2
  723. Authoritarianism stems from a conformist personality reading the world as dangerous. — ch. 2
  724. Program delivery style outweighs specific anti-bias techniques or content. — ch. 2
  725. Suppressing a stigmatized trait causes people to project it onto others. — ch. 2
  726. Right-wing authoritarianism maps onto a single Big-5 derived trait of social conformity — ch. 2
  727. External and internal motives to avoid prejudice produce different emotions as control cues — ch. 2
  728. The F scale collapsed partly because all items were positively worded, inflating acquiescence — ch. 2
  729. Symbolic racism outweighs egalitarian beliefs in shaping White racial policy views — ch. 2
  730. Enduring prejudice reduction requires internal motivation, not just external pressure. — ch. 2
  731. White racial conservatism is driven by anti-Black antagonism, not White identity or favoritism. — ch. 2
  732. Conflicting pro-equality and anti-equality norms make Americans feel genuine internal conflict — ch. 2
  733. Societal blending of groups could eventually make ethnic prejudice obsolete — ch. 2
  734. Allport wrote prejudice theory from anti-Semitism and psychodynamic thinking — ch. 2
  735. Self-disclosure reduces prejudice by thickening perception of outgroup individuals — ch. 2
  736. Classic Jim Crow racism mostly vanished from White America by the 1990s. — ch. 2
  737. Aggression can be heightened by frustrations unrelated to the target — ch. 2
  738. Even minimal, meaningless group membership triggers ingroup-favoring discrimination in children — ch. 2
  739. Intrinsic religiosity tracks tolerance only on overt, community-proscribed measures — ch. 2
  740. Apparent racial inconsistency can reflect adherence to divergent contextual norms — ch. 2
  741. About half of all prejudiced attitudes stem from conformity alone — ch. 2
  742. Intergroup anxiety arises from anticipated negative consequences and perceived threats — ch. 2
  743. Allport’s contact program framework survived except on structural discrimination — ch. 2
  744. Israeli Jewish-Arab dialogue programs produced inconsistent attitude change year to year — ch. 2
  745. Perceived social support for prejudice blocks objective counter-information from changing beliefs — ch. 2
  746. Personal prejudice toward groups tracks perceived social norms almost exactly — ch. 2
  747. Extrinsic religiosity raises prejudice only toward groups one’s religion condemns — ch. 2
  748. Allport theorized about inner conflict in prejudice without empirical data — ch. 2
  749. Adding external motivation undermines those already internally motivated against prejudice. — ch. 2
  750. Allport credited universalistic religious teachings, not open-ended quest, for reducing prejudice — ch. 2
  751. Contact effects on prejudice are strongest when the contact measure is friendship — ch. 2
  752. Modern racial prejudice has four coherent measurement themes distinct from old-fashioned racism — ch. 2
  753. Prejudice stems from distinct threat and competition motives — ch. 2
  754. Religious upbringing and church membership correlate with higher prejudice. — ch. 2
  755. Allport attributed prejudice to fear and anxiety while Adorno traced it to displaced aggression — ch. 2
  756. Prejudice conformity is normal, adaptive, and learned from local norms — ch. 2
  757. Indirect programs improve intergroup relations without ever discussing prejudice explicitly — ch. 2
  758. Psychoanalytic ideas collapsed from near-universal to marginal in social psychology within fifty years — ch. 2
  759. Allport’s distinction between direct and mote-beam projection is unfalsifiable and collapses into a continuum — ch. 2
  760. Right-wing authoritarianism tracks perceived threat and danger in the social world — ch. 2
  761. Support for group equality far exceeds support for individual equality among White Americans — ch. 2
  762. People can be sincerely unaware of their own biased feelings — ch. 2
  763. Sustained motivation plus automatic control mechanisms can fully break the prejudice habit — ch. 2
  764. Allport identified learning, conformity, and contact as routes to prejudice in children — ch. 2
  765. Conformity is now viewed as normal rather than pathological — ch. 2
  766. Prejudice is transmitted through the same conformity pressures as any social norm — ch. 2
  767. General mood states (‘incidental affect’) demonstrably shape intergroup judgments. — ch. 2
  768. Authoritarians are not personally maladjusted; their fear is learned belief — ch. 2
  769. Polish anti-Jewish violence grew from projecting Polish collaboration onto Jews — ch. 2
  770. Group status and competition determine which stereotype each outgroup receives — ch. 2
  771. The F scale measured attitudes, not personality, and conflated the two — ch. 2
  772. Everyday stereotyping involves hot emotions, not only extreme bigotry — ch. 2
  773. Authoritarianism arises from social learning about threat, not harsh parenting — ch. 2
  774. Social desirability bias does not currently invalidate survey measures of racial attitudes. — ch. 2
  775. Outgroup accusations often reveal the accuser’s own repressed faults — ch. 2
  776. Evangelical Christianity predicts higher symbolic racism among White Americans — ch. 2
  777. Racial prejudice can be primed without explicitly racist appeals — ch. 2
  778. A single dissenting voice can shift private attitudes about racism — ch. 2
  779. Individual psychodynamic theories cannot explain shared specific stereotype content — ch. 2
  780. Emotions may predict prejudiced behavior better than cognitions do — ch. 2
  781. Subtle modern prejudice is changed expression, not genuine reduction — ch. 2
  782. White Americans’ prejudice clashed with their own democratic and Christian values — ch. 2
  783. Threatened self-esteem drives people to derogate stigmatized groups to feel better — ch. 2
  784. Hate requires love for the threatened ingroup as a precondition — ch. 2
  785. Emotions mediate the link between group appraisals and action tendencies — ch. 2
  786. Prejudice development is constrained by cognitive stages, not just learning — ch. 2
  787. Old-fashioned biological racism largely disappeared among US Whites by the 1990s — ch. 2
  788. Authoritarians show no deficit in self-esteem or general adjustment — ch. 2
  789. Children’s prejudice shows as avoidance and exclusion rather than overt hostility — ch. 2
  790. Salient group membership makes people treat the group’s fate as their own — ch. 2
  791. Evolution tuned humans to feel distinct emotions for distinct intergroup threats — ch. 2
  792. Allport uniquely linked authoritarian prejudice to rigid dichotomous thinking — ch. 2
  793. Allport already saw prejudice as driven by internal development, not only learned imitation — ch. 2
  794. Attitude-behavior gaps may stem from developmental shifts toward cognitive control — ch. 2
  795. Conformity carries both individual survival and cultural efficiency benefits — ch. 2
  796. Changing perceived social consensus shifts racial prejudice strongly and persistently — ch. 2
  797. Standards of what counts as prejudice shift with prevailing norms — ch. 2
  798. Apparent inner conflict often masks attempts to match local norms — ch. 2
  799. Minority children resist full internalization of discrimination-preparation socialization — ch. 2
  800. Exposing the racist subtext of coded appeals can make Whites repudiate them — ch. 2
  801. Psychodynamic prejudice theories cannot explain consensual stereotypes like specific group characterizations — ch. 2
  802. Personal disclosure plus category typicality generalizes contact benefits to new outgroup members — ch. 2
  803. A single antiracist dissenter shifts even private attitudes against prejudice — ch. 2
  804. Only low-prejudice people feel guilt when their behavior falls short of their nonprejudiced ideals — ch. 2
  805. Suppressing unwanted thoughts ironically increases their accessibility and causes projection onto others. — ch. 2
  806. Prejudice research still lacks validated measures of emotion and of ingroup-pressure discrimination — ch. 2
  807. Personality and social situation affect prejudice only through ideological worldviews. — ch. 2
  808. People vary widely in how strongly they internalize nonprejudiced ideals — ch. 2
  809. Social dominance orientation reduces to a single Tough-mindedness trait — ch. 2
  810. A theory’s ideas surviving later research tests signals enduring intellectual merit — ch. 2
  811. Prejudice is multidetermined with no single variable explaining it — ch. 2
  812. Prejudice and stereotypes can operate implicitly without perceivers’ awareness — ch. 2
  813. Conformity to group norms peaks in preadolescence then declines — ch. 2
  814. Rejecting one outgroup predicts rejecting all outgroups, marking prejudice as a personality trait — ch. 2
  815. Social norms shift prejudice only from groups people belong to or aspire to — ch. 2
  816. Self-reliance values predict anti-Black attitudes while humanitarianism predicts pro-Black attitudes — ch. 2
  817. Cooperative learning increases intergroup friendships while competition reduces them. — ch. 2
  818. Religious intrinsic orientation tracks whatever attitudes one’s religion endorses — ch. 2
  819. Repression of prejudice is protective but leaves people vulnerable to later prejudiced responses — ch. 2
  820. Projection onto others reduces accessibility of one’s threatening traits. — ch. 2
  821. Even progressive White scholars of 1954 understated state support for racial caste. — ch. 2
  822. How one believes and what one believes are inextricably entwined — ch. 2
  823. Exposing subtle racism as violating egalitarian norms can trigger repudiation — ch. 2
  824. Intergroup anxiety uniquely drives group-protective behaviors that general anxiety does not — ch. 2
  825. Extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations are independent dimensions, not opposing types — ch. 2
  826. Shared information dominates group discussions, amplifying consensus stereotypes — ch. 2
  827. Intrinsic religion reflects in-group conformity, not reduced prejudice — ch. 2
  828. Children’s openness to minorities is later overridden by learned societal views — ch. 2
  829. Definitional vagueness condemned projection research until a process approach emerged — ch. 2
  830. How and what people believe religiously are not separable dimensions — ch. 2
  831. Allport doubted that group contact progresses peacefully without qualifiers. — ch. 2
  832. Devout religion’s self-esteem boost may heighten rather than reduce prejudice — ch. 2
  833. Contextual threat and competition alter prejudice by shifting worldviews. — ch. 2
  834. Allport’s 1954 evaluation design remains the current gold standard — ch. 2
  835. Conformity in attitudes is normal and adaptive, not a personality defect — ch. 2
  836. Allport’s projective-inkblot view of outgroups was neglected by later stereotyping research — ch. 2
  837. Projection’s definition required a definitive trait-possession metric that psychology lacks — ch. 2
  838. Prejudice functions psychologically as a response to ego weakness and inner threat — ch. 2
  839. Group category salience during contact enables attitude generalization to the outgroup — ch. 2
  840. Most White respondents show no ingroup favoritism on blatant thermometer measures — ch. 2
  841. Americans hold prejudices against Iraqis, gays, and drunk drivers alike — ch. 2
  842. Allport distinguished rational hatred from character-conditioned hatred rooted in frustrated personalities — ch. 2
  843. Contact reduces prejudice through five distinct mediating processes spanning cognitive, affective, and behavioral channels. — ch. 2
  844. Researchers should study how belief style correlates with belief content — ch. 2
  845. Authoritarian Personality research found attitudes across unrelated outgroups strongly correlate — ch. 2
  846. Religious devotion can prompt recategorizing one’s identity to all of humanity — ch. 2
  847. Only 67 percent of White Americans support racial equality in principle — ch. 2
  848. The same prejudice lapse triggers guilt or threat depending on motivation source — ch. 2
  849. Intergroup relations programs multiplied only decades after they began appearing — ch. 2
  850. Believing others share one’s prejudice gives social permission to act on it. — ch. 2
  851. Holmes’s critiques ended empirical projection research for decades — ch. 2
  852. Equal status and cooperation are critical conditions for contact to reduce prejudice — ch. 2
  853. Differentiated intergroup emotions predict behavior better than a single hatred construct — ch. 2
  854. Allport predicted people respond to value conflict by circumventing or genuinely resolving it. — ch. 2
  855. Contact research has split into two questions of when and how contact reduces prejudice — ch. 2
  856. Local subgroup norms, not national culture, sustain prejudice in the US — ch. 2
  857. Individuating contact can fail to generalize to other group members — ch. 2
  858. Even motivated, low-prejudice people differ widely in regulating biased behavior — ch. 2
  859. Social desirability bias does not measurably invalidate prejudice survey measures — ch. 2
  860. Normative pressure changes prejudice’s expression, not its underlying strength. — ch. 2
  861. White racial identity barely predicts racial policy while outgroup antagonism strongly does — ch. 2
  862. Acting on behalf of prejudice targets beats learning about prejudice — ch. 2
  863. Shifting perceived social norms measurably reduces harmful behaviors like binge drinking — ch. 2
  864. People resolve prejudice conflict through denial, rationalization, and compromise mechanisms. — ch. 2
  865. Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are the strongest individual-difference predictors of prejudice. — ch. 2
  866. Intellectual defeat of prejudice fails to extinguish its emotional residue — ch. 2
  867. Racism persists today as egalitarian values mixed with racial animus — ch. 2
  868. Only one study measured moral education’s effect on prejudice, with positive results — ch. 2
  869. Experimentally induced thought suppression turns anyone into a projector — ch. 2
  870. Allport’s 1954 theory of prejudice inner conflict proved prescient to later research. — ch. 2
  871. Aversive racists discriminate only where bias can be excused nonracially — ch. 2
  872. Salient categorization during intergroup contact can breed anxiety rather than reduce prejudice. — ch. 2
  873. Condemned categories like drunk drivers sit alongside racial prejudice in American attitudinal consensus — ch. 2
  874. Implicit racial bias operates outside conscious awareness and explicit beliefs — ch. 2
  875. Ending state support for segregation changed the form of prejudice — ch. 2
  876. Prejudice in children does not rise gradually and does not track parental attitudes. — ch. 2
  877. Post-civil-rights attitude-behavior gaps birthed modern prejudice theories — ch. 2
  878. Others’ disapproval can rival inner conviction in constraining prejudice — ch. 2
  879. Superficial casual contact between groups can worsen rather than reduce prejudice. — ch. 2
  880. Old-fashioned racism weakly predicts politics; symbolic racism strongly does — ch. 2
  881. Allport paired tolerant personality origins with secure permissive parenting — ch. 2
  882. General outgroup knowledge is weak, but individuating knowledge reduces bias — ch. 2
  883. Highly educated Whites’ lower prejudice scores may reflect dissembling, not tolerance — ch. 2
  884. Individual-difference and intergroup approaches to prejudice have remained disconnected since Allport. — ch. 2
  885. Multicultural education depends mainly on passive didactic content delivery — ch. 2
  886. Allport’s theory of prejudice outlasted Adorno’s in empirical value — ch. 2
  887. Highly identified group members minimize collective guilt by morally reinterpreting ingroup wrongs — ch. 2
  888. Intergroup anxiety narrows attention and biases perceptions toward expectations — ch. 2
  889. Retaining group salience optimizes contact more than eliminating categories does — ch. 2
  890. Allport located generalized prejudice in ego weakness under threat and ambiguity — ch. 2
  891. Religion’s relationship to egalitarianism and prejudice remains under-researched — ch. 2
  892. Minority children develop racial attitudes between parental shaping and individual variation — ch. 2
  893. Intrinsic religion suppresses only overt prejudice, not covert forms. — ch. 2
  894. Affect caused by an intergroup encounter may operate differently than incidental affect — ch. 2
  895. Major life transitions force people to renegotiate local attitude norms — ch. 2
  896. Allport explained hatred through insecurity, social learning, and cognitive-economy exclusionism — ch. 2
  897. Whether prejudice counts as justified depends on local cultural norms. — ch. 2
  898. SDO and RWA rest on opposite personality trait clusters — ch. 2
  899. Positive outgroup modeling alone fails because people dismiss attitude-contradicting evidence — ch. 2
  900. Perceived ingroup strength converts threats from fear into anger — ch. 2
  901. Warmth and competence judgments predict distinct emotional reactions to groups — ch. 2
  902. Selective evidence use lets people maintain the illusion of being objective while holding prejudice — ch. 2
  903. Perceived deviance motivates attitude change while perceived consensus resists it — ch. 2
  904. Prejudice in children shows up as withheld positive evaluations, not just overt negativity. — ch. 2
  905. Observational studies undercount children’s prejudice because attitudes need triggering situations. — ch. 2
  906. Subtyping protects stereotypes by exempting counter-evidence as exceptions. — ch. 2
  907. Frequency of religious involvement reveals intrinsic versus extrinsic orientation — ch. 2
  908. Decategorization predicts contact works when group salience is minimized — ch. 2
  909. Shallow group contacts reinforce prejudice through failed information and mutual misreading. — ch. 2
  910. Personality traits determine whether adolescents accept or reject learned prejudice — ch. 2
  911. Allport’s legacy lies in suggestive leads, not settled demonstrations — ch. 2
  912. Collective emotions like group anger and guilt arise from ingroup appraisals — ch. 2
  913. Old-fashioned racism exposure damages Republican politicians but not always egalitarian appeals — ch. 2
  914. Aversive racism arises from conflict between disavowed anti-Black feelings and egalitarian beliefs — ch. 2
  915. Moral education programs aim to raise moral reasoning via dilemma discussions — ch. 2
  916. Multicultural education improves intergroup relations in most but not all studies. — ch. 2
  917. Category salience must persist alongside intimacy for contact effects to generalize — ch. 2
  918. Individual and intergroup theories of prejudice may share underlying motivational mechanisms. — ch. 2
  919. Contact reduces prejudice chiefly through affective processes even amid active conflict — ch. 2
  920. Believing in equal opportunity coexists without felt conflict with blaming Blacks’ lack of effort — ch. 2
  921. Ingroup members harshly punish peers who hold balanced or moderate outgroup attitudes — ch. 2
  922. Observing ingroup friends interact with outgroups reduces one’s future intergroup anxiety — ch. 2
  923. Internal egalitarian motives track social identity, not fixed personality traits. — ch. 2
  924. Allport misclassified normative prejudice as deviant irrationality — ch. 2
  925. Psychologists can define a phenomenon so restrictively that no study can ever find it — ch. 2
  926. The same conformity pathway both creates and can reduce prejudice — ch. 2
  927. Media-saturated environments normalize prejudice as ambient background — ch. 2
  928. Projection requires only dread of a trait, not actually possessing it — ch. 2
  929. Symbolic racism may coexist comfortably with stated belief in equal opportunity — ch. 2
  930. Demagogues succeed by channeling authoritarian insecurity toward outgroup targets during social instability — ch. 2
  931. Doctrines of election make prejudice while doctrines of compassion unmake it — ch. 2
  932. Survey items fail to capture respondents’ own lived experience of inner conflict and racism — ch. 2
  933. Reported low prejudice among the religious reflects self-presentation, not true tolerance — ch. 2
  934. Allport grounded prejudice in dispositional threat perception rather than its situational activation — ch. 2
  935. Friendly contact and generalized attitude change are in tension with each other — ch. 2
  936. Social consensus, not just conformity, underlies most acquired prejudice — ch. 2
  937. RWA and SDO scales measure ideological attitudes, not underlying personality traits — ch. 2
  938. The Holocaust forced Americans to confront their own group-based prejudice — ch. 2
  939. Stereotypes often rationalize preexisting emotions toward outgroups — ch. 2
  940. Religious activity frequency substitutes as a proxy measure for intrinsic orientation — ch. 2
  941. Culture shapes which traits become candidates for projective stereotyping — ch. 2
  942. Research on how intergroup programs produce change is still in its infancy — ch. 2
  943. Removing official state support forced prejudice itself to change form. — ch. 2
  944. Allport’s contact hypothesis rested on four distinct situational conditions. — ch. 2
  945. Prejudice can serve unconscious self-esteem needs people rationalize away — ch. 2
  946. Projection makes outgroup accusations reveal the perceiver’s own rejected traits — ch. 2
  947. Cooperative interventions vary in competition and require staff pretraining — ch. 2
  948. Allport defined empathy as putting oneself in another’s shoes and linked it to tolerance — ch. 2
  949. Over a third of White Americans simultaneously endorse equality and symbolic racism without distress. — ch. 2
  950. Stereotypes resist change through subtyping, so prejudice reduction should target emotions instead. — ch. 2
  951. External pressure to avoid prejudice can backfire and worsen it. — ch. 2
  952. Institutionalized religious practice breeds prejudice while interiorized religion reduces it. — ch. 2
  953. Scholarly interest in internal prejudice conflict arose only after legal desegregation norms shifted. — ch. 2
  954. A large share of Whites hold simultaneously egalitarian and prejudiced beliefs — ch. 2
  955. Groups can serve as living inkblots for projecting psychodynamic fears — ch. 2
  956. Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity are independent dimensions, not polar opposites. — ch. 2
  957. Older children accept moral reasons against exclusion more readily than younger ones — ch. 2
  958. A standardized prejudice measure for young children only appeared by 1975 — ch. 2
  959. Allport defined prejudice as motivated antipathy, not mere misperception — ch. 2
  960. Projection results from failed thought suppression rather than actual possession of traits — ch. 2
  961. RWA and SDO each predict prejudice only toward groups matching their specific motivational trigger — ch. 2
  962. Allport saw prejudice as ordinary yet unacceptable, creating inner conflict — ch. 2
  963. Religious institutions can function as prejudice-reducing solutions, not just causes — ch. 2
  964. Allport acknowledged minority children become racially aware earlier than whites do — ch. 2
  965. Self-image threat increases derogation of stigmatized groups as esteem repair — ch. 2
  966. Distinct intergroup emotions have separate causes and behavioral effects — ch. 2
  967. Discussion with likeminded peers pushes group attitudes further in their initial direction — ch. 2
  968. Five-year-olds favor negative over positive group associations as informative. — ch. 2
  969. Positive contact reduces prejudice most when group membership stays salient — ch. 2
  970. Expression of prejudice diverges from private belief depending on perceived social norms. — ch. 2
  971. Religiosity’s link to prejudice depends on whether the prejudice is proscribed. — ch. 2
  972. Whites now universally repudiate explicit group dominance and endorse formal equality — ch. 2

Annotation Roundup

Question