Ingroup membership is a shifting, context-dependent self-definition tied to self-enhancement
Evidence
Anticipating some later theoretical developments (see below), he suggested that an ingroup exists when āmembers [of it] all use the term we with the same essential signiļ¬canceā (p. 31). Thus, at the outset Allport opts for a subjective conception of the ingroup rather than one based purely on objective criteria, emphasizing that ingroup attachment is a shifting and elastic process, dependent on the particular context in which one ļ¬nds oneself. He explains that āingroup memberships are not permanently ļ¬xed. For certain purposes an individual may afļ¬rm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger category. It depends on his need for self-enhancementā (p. 35). ā John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 424
Anticipating some later theoretical developments (see below), he suggested that an ingroup exists when āmembers [of it] all use the term we with the same essential signiļ¬canceā (p. 31). Thus, at the outset Allport opts for a subjective conception of the ingroup rather than one based purely on objective criteria, emphasizing that ingroup attachment is a shifting and elastic process, dependent on the particular context in which one ļ¬nds oneself. He explains that āingroup memberships are not permanently ļ¬xed. For certain purposes an individual may afļ¬rm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger category. It depends on his need for self-enhancementā (p. 35). ā , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature ofā¦, 424
Allport begins by considering what ingroups are. Anticipating some later theoretical developments (see below), he suggested that an ingroup exists when āmembers [of it] all use the term we with the same essential signiļ¬canceā (p. 31). Thus, at the outset Allport opts for a subjective conception of the ingroup rather than one based purely on objective criteria, emphasizing that ingroup attachment is a shifting and elastic process, dependent on the particular context in which one ļ¬nds oneself. He explains that āingroup memberships are not permanently ļ¬xed. For certain purposes an individual may afļ¬rm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger category. It depends on his need for self-enhancementā (p. 35). ā , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature ofā¦, 424
Categorization
- XREF: The self-enhancement-driven elasticity of group membership connects to Optimal Distinctiveness Theory later in this chapter, and to the broader social identity literature. ā connects to: Self-interest is redefined by whatever level the collective self-categorisation occupies ā John Drury, The role of social identity processesā¦, 50; Participation itself changes participantsā self-conceptions before any external victory
- QUESTION: Allportās āneed for self-enhancementā as the driver of shifting group boundaries ā worth probing how this relates to threat-based ingroup narrowing (e.g., ethnic group salience spikes under threat).
- DEFINE: Allport defines ingroup membership subjectively (shared āweā) rather than by objective criteria, and as elastic across contexts.
- corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim ā John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Yearsā¦, 424; , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature ofā¦, 424