Prejudice is antipathy based on inflexible generalization, not mere misperception

Evidence

For him, prejudice was not simply a conditioned prejudgment about an individual or group, it was a felt or expressed “antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (1954/1979, p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman’s ch. 2 this volume). It was not simply a misperception or an expectation; it was a dislike or hatred. The basis for this aversion was factually wrong and impervious to correction because the aversion served important psychological functions for the prejudiced individual. Thus, Allport’s analysis went well beyond attention to a predisposition to prejudice; he also considered the role that prejudice plays in the life of the individual. He considered the fears, anxieties, and inadequacies to which prejudice speaks that make it resistant to correction and a source of viscous, inhumane acts. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2565

Moreover, this oversight led to a narrow view of prejudice – prejudice as antipathy – that failed to encompass more subtle, but equally pernicious, manifestations of prejudice. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 743

Categorization

• DEFINE: Allport’s operative definition of prejudice: antipathy resting on a faulty and inflexible generalization, distinct from mere stereotyping.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how categorization becomes motivated bias, and to Gordon Allport’s foundational typology versus modern dual-process models. — connects to: Most out-groups elicit mixed prejudice, not pure antipathy — Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype…, 123
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 2565; , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 743