Prejudice arises from perceived mismatch between group traits and roles

Evidence

Consistent with this analysis, variations in role requirements frame prejudices. Allport (1954/1979) recognized the contextual quality of prejudice with examples of the “curious patterns” (p. 55) of discrimination such as allowing “a Negro to work in my kitchen but not a Jew” whereas “a Jew but not a Negro may sit in my parlor” (p. 55). However, he did not provide an abstract analysis of this contextualism or recognize its generality. This generality has become fully apparent in contemporary research. For example, in a meta-analysis of Goldberg Paradigm experiments, more substantial bias was present when women were evaluated in a masculine or neutral domain rather than a feminine domain (Swim et al., 1989). Similarly, a meta-analysis of Goldberg Paradigm studies of leadership behavior showed that women are more devalued, compared with equivalent men, when occupying male-dominated roles that are presumably incongruent for women (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992). Organizational research has confirmed that women who enter male-dominated work settings often receive hostile reactions (e.g., Collinson, Knights, & Collinson, 1990), which can include sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, 1993). Also, gay men are particularly at risk for prejudiced reactions in roles to which they are stereotypically mismatched – for example, military service (Segal, Gade, & Johnson, 1993). Gay men’s relatively effeminate image is incongruent with the tough, masculine role that military organizations construct for soldiers (Goldstein, 2001). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 198

Despite these insights, Allport did not appreciate the fundamental sense in which prejudice relies on discordance between the qualities ascribed to a group and the qualities believed to be essential for carrying out available social roles. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 189

The best way to understand the nature of prejudice is to take both the structure of the social environment and the psychological structure of the individual into account. This does not constitute a complete departure from Allport’s (1954/1979) views because he allowed for sociocultural conditions as moderators of prejudice. For example, in chapter 14 he considered “sociocultural laws of prejudice” (pp. 211–13), such as how rapid social change fosters prejudice. Despite these insights, Allport did not appreciate the fundamental sense in which prejudice relies on discordance between the qualities ascribed to a group and the qualities believed to be essential for carrying out available social roles. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 189

Our framework thus retains Allport’s emphasis on feelings and beliefs about a social group but also emphasizes the social-structural position of targeted groups. We argue that the potential for prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is inconsistent with the attributes that are believed to be required for success in certain classes of social roles. We reject Allport’s (1954/1979) prescription that a stereotype must generally be an “exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Regardless of the accuracy of the consensual beliefs held about a social group, prejudice consists of a lowering of the evaluation of members of the stereotyped group as occupants or potential occupants of an incongruent role, compared with the evaluation of members of groups for whom the role is congruent. This evaluative decline can occur regardless of whether or not the targeted individual fits the stereotype. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 190

Categorization

• XREF: Corroborates and generalizes the Allport ‘curious patterns’ kitchen/parlor example; connects to role congruity theory of prejudice which bears on both Islamophobia and antisemitism vault clusters. — connects to: the MOC “The Enemy-Making Machine: Ours, True, and the Identity That Defends Both”
• DEFINE: Introduces the core definitional framework of the book: prejudice as a mismatch between ascribed group qualities and role-required qualities.
• corroborated: 13 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 198; John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 189; , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 189 (+1 more)