Automatic stereotype activation is controllable and context-dependent

Evidence

Cognitive indicators of socially shared understanding have recently revealed themselves to be less automatic and more malleable than psychologists originally thought (Payne, 2001). If the relatively automatic forms of understanding indeed are controllable, then they should correlate with more explicit forms of response, and researchers do sometimes find that the two kinds of responses correlate nicely (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). Motives can operate even on an unconscious level: Chronically active egalitarian goals can prevent preconscious, automatic activation of stereotypes (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Social context also moderates what were thought to be relatively automatic associations; a black man in a church is perceived differently than when he is on a run-down street (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 333

Categorization

• XREF: Corroborates and updates any vault claims that implicit attitudes are automatic and thus fixed; Payne 2001 and Wittenbrink context effects are canon in this literature. — connects to: Stereotype-driven trait-priming effects operate without conscious awareness and are culturally shared — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 223; Distraction raises stereotype expression but lowers stereotype activation — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 239
• QUESTION: If automatic associations are controllable and context-sensitive, what does that do to the predictive validity claims built on IAT-style measures across the vault?
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 333