Prejudice stems from role-stereotype incongruity, not from exaggerated or inaccurate beliefs

Evidence

Our framework thus retains Allport’s emphasis on feelings and beliefs about a social group but also emphasizes the social-structural position of targeted groups. We argue that the potential for prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is inconsistent with the attributes that are believed to be required for success in certain classes of social roles. We reject Allport’s (1954/1979) prescription that a stereotype must generally be an “exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Regardless of the accuracy of the consensual beliefs held about a social group, prejudice consists of a lowering of the evaluation of members of the stereotyped group as occupants or potential occupants of an incongruent role, compared with the evaluation of members of groups for whom the role is congruent. This evaluative decline can occur regardless of whether or not the targeted individual fits the stereotype. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 190

Our expanded treatment of prejudice rests upon the simple idea of role incongruity – that prejudice often results from the mismatch between beliefs about the attributes typically possessed by members of a social group (that is, their stereotype) and beliefs about the attributes that facilitate success in valued social roles. In this analysis, a member of a group whose stereotypical attributes are thought to facilitate performance in a role is ordinarily preferred over a member of a group whose stereotypical attributes are thought to impede performance, even in the absence of objective differences between the two individuals. Such incongruity between stereotypical characteristics and social roles does not necessarily lead to a generalized hostile attitude toward the mismatched individual but to a decline in evaluation relative to a matched individual in the context of the particular role. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 174

Our framework thus retains Allport’s emphasis on feelings and beliefs about a social group but also emphasizes the social-structural position of targeted groups. We argue that the potential for prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a social group that is inconsistent with the attributes that are believed to be required for success in certain classes of social roles. We reject Allport’s (1954/1979) prescription that a stereotype must generally be an “exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Regardless of the accuracy of the consensual beliefs held about a social group, prejudice consists of a lowering of the evaluation of members of the stereotyped group as occupants or potential occupants of an incongruent role, compared with the evaluation of members of groups for whom the role is congruent. This evaluative decline can occur regardless of whether or not the targeted individual fits the stereotype. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 190

Categorization

• DEFINE: Redefines prejudice away from Allport’s inaccuracy criterion toward role incongruity — a conceptual redefinition.
• XREF: Directly expands/challenges Allport-era antipathy-based definitions of prejudice already in the vault; connects to role-congruity theory used in modern sexism research.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing whether role-incongruity without hostility applies across the Islamophobia/antisemitism clusters or whether those are genuinely malevolent forms.
• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 190; John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 174; , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 190