Whether prejudice counts as justified depends on local cultural norms.

Evidence

Because what is acceptable and normal in one context may be unacceptable in another, it is important to untangle the psychological process of negative feelings toward a person or group (prejudice) from whether or not these feelings are generally sanctioned (social norms). Many researchers define prejudice as unjustified negative attitudes toward social groups or their members. Similarly, Allport (1954/1979) defined prejudice as “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant,” and ethnic prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman, ch. 2 this volume). The problem is that what is commonly perceived to be “justified” or “warranted” depends primarily on the cultural rules about the acceptability of prejudice (see Crandall & Martinez, 1996). In practice, “justifiable” is a very flexible, norm-sensitive standard (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). What appears justified to some people does not to others. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1903

Because what is acceptable and normal in one context may be unacceptable in another, it is important to untangle the psychological process of negative feelings toward a person or group (prejudice) from whether or not these feelings are generally sanctioned (social norms). Many researchers define prejudice as unjustified negative attitudes toward social groups or their members. Similarly, Allport (1954/1979) defined prejudice as “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant,” and ethnic prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman, ch. 2 this volume). The problem is that what is commonly perceived to be “justified” or “warranted” depends primarily on the cultural rules about the acceptability of prejudice (see Crandall & Martinez, 1996). In practice, “justifiable” is a very flexible, norm-sensitive standard (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). What appears justified to some people does not to others. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1903

Because what is acceptable and normal in one context may be unacceptable in another, it is important to untangle the psychological process of negative feelings toward a person or group (prejudice) from whether or not these feelings are generally sanctioned (social norms). Many researchers define prejudice as unjustified negative attitudes toward social groups or their members. Similarly, Allport (1954/1979) defined prejudice as “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant,” and ethnic prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9; see also Eagly & Diekman, ch. 2 this volume). The problem is that what is commonly perceived to be “justified” or “warranted” depends primarily on the cultural rules about the acceptability of prejudice (see Crandall & Martinez, 1996). In practice, “justifiable” is a very flexible, norm-sensitive standard (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). What appears justified to some people does not to others. … Of course, conformity does not always imply prejudice – many group norms, and indeed the American credo itself (e.g., Tocqueville, 1839/ 1969), are based on tolerance, egalitarianism, and recognizing the humanity of all people, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, or class. As a result, in America (as in other societies), in addition to norms that suggest that there are real, valid, group differences (prejudice norms), there are other norms that promote egalitarianism and equality (see Devine, ch. 20 this volume). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1903

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines Allport’s prejudice as ‘thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant’ and shows how ‘warrant’ dissolves into norm-sensitivity.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s prior notes on moral panics (Crandall & Martinez 1996 cited) and on how social norms sanction or suppress attitudes — echoes the moral dimension of Cohen’s panic concept. — connects to: Prejudiced people are normal because they are well adapted to their culture. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 1834
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1903; , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1903