Bigot rationalizations read as ideology rather than irrational personality defect

Evidence

Thus, Allport overemphasized the role of personality in prejudice, seeing bigots as having weak personalities, as insecure, easily frustrated, and intolerant of ambiguity. A more politically sophisticated psychology now emphasizes individual differences in adherence to group-based ideologies as accounting for individuals’ proneness to prejudice. In an often-cited example, Allport (p. 13) provided a hypothetical conversation illustrating how the prejudiced Mr. X’s stereotypical beliefs about Jews conveniently shift in response to factual counterevidence offered by the tolerant Mr. Y, but always in ways that maintain and justify his antipathy toward Jewish people. For Allport, such slipperiness was evidence of irrational motivational and emotional needs. Contemporary perspectives on prejudice (e.g., Jackman; Jost & Hamilton) interpret such rationalizations in a different light, as well-rehearsed, internally consistent, and socially validated justifications for group inequality. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 152

Categorization

• XREF: Directly bears on the vault’s prejudice-psychology thread: reframes Allport’s ‘slippery bigot’ mechanism from motivation to ideology justification — changes the predicted remedy.
• DEFINE: Distinguishes the older motivational/personality reading from the newer ideological-justification reading of prejudiced belief-flexibility.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 152