Prejudice takes benevolent paternalistic forms that disadvantage groups without antipathy

Evidence

Perhaps a victim of his time, he overlooked, as Rudman describes it, the “ordinariness of gender prejudice.” Only two pages of his book (pp. 33– 4) were dedicated to an analysis of sexism. Several chapters in our volume (Eagly & Diekman, Jackman, and Rudman) redress this oversight, drawing attention not only to the issue of sexism, but also to the inadequacy of defining prejudice solely as an antipathy. The consequence of this challenge to conceptions of the nature of prejudice is profound, suggesting that prejudice comes in qualitatively different forms, such as an ostensibly benevolent paternalism that disadvantages groups without apparent antipathy, that Allport and, for many years, the rest of the field, simply missed. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139

Categorization

• XREF: Directly challenges the vault’s contact/prejudice-psychology claims built on Allport’s antipathy definition; connects to modern work on benevolent sexism and paternalism as control mechanisms. — connects to: Most out-groups elicit mixed prejudice, not pure antipathy — Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype…, 123; Paternalistic prejudice combines assumed superiority with caretaking toward warm but incompetent groups. — Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype…, 257; Paternalistic prejudice rewards warmth but exacts a competence cost — Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype…, 303
• DEEPTHINKING: Proposes a qualitative redefinition of prejudice beyond antipathy to include cooperative-looking control, which reconfigures what counts as evidence for prejudice reduction across the field.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 139