Prejudice motivates perceived group differences rather than emerging from them

Evidence

Given the arguments of Allport and others, and our own analysis of the relevant issues, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, group differences obviously exist (Campbell, 1967). Second, although the prejudiced perceiver often begins with some true core difference, this is then exaggerated such that between-group differences are accentuated and withingroup differences are minimized (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Third, because the valence of attributed characteristics is somewhat malleable, the social perceiver can slant the evaluative quality of group differences by his or her choice of descriptors. Fourth, it is the prejudiced sentiments of the social perceiver that motivates these exaggerated group differences, not the other way around. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 892

Nevertheless, contemporary findings do seem to suggest important possibilities for future rapprochement. For example, the dual-process cognitive motivational model of personality, ideological attitudes, and prejudice described earlier sees RWA as influencing prejudice through sensitivity to perceived threat from outgroups, while SDO influences prejudice against outgroups through competitiveness, dominance, and superiority. It is interesting that the two dominant intergroup theories of prejudice, Realistic Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory, suggest similar processes operating at the level of intergroup dynamics; the former sees prejudiced attitudes towards outgroups as being elicited by intergroup threat, whereas the latter sees intergroup attitudes as determined primarily by intergroup competitiveness over relative status and superiority. Both intergroup and individual-difference approaches may thus operate through the same motivational mechanisms, with one approach delineating the intergroup processes that activate these motives, and the other individual differences in proneness to their activation. The most important priority for future research and theory may therefore be the development and testing of such integrative models to provide a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the causes and dynamics of prejudice. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 2492

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The claim that real group differences exist but prejudice motivates their exaggeration — with valence malleability as the mechanism — resists a one-line summation and inverts a common causal assumption worth sitting with.
• XREF: This directly echoes the reader’s established corpus on motivated cognition and how perception is warped by interests — e.g. Milgrom on how reputational interests shape trading behavior. — connects to: Implicit racial appeals drive welfare opposition through reduced deservingness perceptions — Rachel Wetts and Robb Willer, Who Is Called by the Dog Whistle?…, 168; Small derogatory perceived differences suffice to justify group advantage — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 3418; Ethnic frictions and status rivalries shape prejudice more than ideology does — John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of…, 2016 (+3 more)
• corroborated: 4 independent passages support this claim — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 892; John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 2492