Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
Evidence
The actual behavior of third parties disconfirms the hypothesis that they care only about their own economic payoffs and thus will never punish (Fig. 1). Most third parties punished dictators who transferred less than half their endowment, and the majority of recipients expected them to do so. At each transfer level below 50, roughly 60% (n = 22) of players C chose to punish the dictator A, and with the exception of transfer level 40, the proportion of recipients B who expected C to punish was higher than the proportion who actually did so. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29
Categorization
- XREF: This is the empirical anchor for Fehr & Fischbacher third-party punishment, which the reading purpose maps onto the Puritan community’s sanction of Hester. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 30; An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13 (+10 more)
- ADDENDUM: Supports the ‘On Sacrifice’ article’s theme of communities paying to uphold moral order — altruistic punishment as a stabilizing mechanism.
Related
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.90)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.89)
- Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.88)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.87)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.87)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.87)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.85)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.85)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.84)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.84)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.83)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.83)
- Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers. (similarity 0.83)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.82)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(1.00) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#exemplifies(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 - Mafia families punish members who poach fellow members’ clients.
#exemplifies(0.90) - Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers.
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 148 - Punishing cheaters by withdrawing cooperation acts as third-party enforcement within the trading community.
#exemplifies(0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 52