An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity.
Evidence
We introduce, in particular, a third party into the dictator game (DG) and the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game. The third party observes the actions of the players in the DG and the PD and can then punish them. Punishment is, however, costly for the third party so a selfish third party will never punish. This design is motivated by the idea that social norms apply in both games: a norm concerning distributional fairness in the DG and a cooperation norm in the PD. The notion of strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Ga¨chter, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) implies that the third parties should be willing to punish the violation of these norms. Thus, if we observe punishment of norm violations, we have evidence that strong reciprocity is also relevant for behavior of third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13
Categorization
- XREF: This third-party design is the experimental operationalization of Fehr & Fischbacher’s third-party punishment central to the reader’s stated framework. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 (+9 more)
- DEFINE: Clarifies how ‘strong reciprocity’ is experimentally distinguished from reputation-driven self-interest: costly punishment by an unaffected observer.
Related
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.91)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.90)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.88)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.87)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.87)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.87)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.84)
- People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.84)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.83)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.83)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.82)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.82)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.82)
- Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.81)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
#corroborates(0.98) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 - People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#corroborates(0.92) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 - Punishing cheaters by withdrawing cooperation acts as third-party enforcement within the trading community.
#expands(0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 52