Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
Evidence
We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly for them. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
Categorization
- DEFINE: Precisely defines strong reciprocity as extending to third-party punishment performed at personal cost.
- XREF: connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 4; People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 (+16 more)
Related
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.92)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.91)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.91)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.90)
- Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. (similarity 0.88)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.88)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.85)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.84)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.84)
- Low-cost punishment of norm violators is a uniquely human trait. (similarity 0.84)
- People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.84)
- Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.82)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.82)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.82)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13 - Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors.
#corroborates(0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 - Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.
#expands(0.72) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Social norm effects hinge on beliefs that others will enforce them.
#qualifies(0.72) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 28