Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
Evidence
Dictators faced severe sanctions in both the secondand third-party conditions, but second-party sanctions for transfers below the egalitarian level were considerably stronger than those by third parties, with the effect that low transfers were profitable for dictators in the TP condition but not in the SP condition. The figure shows that second parties punished more than third parties for all transfer levels below 50, while punishment was generally very low and similar across conditions for transfer levels above 50. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82
A comparison of coefficients in the two conditions shows that Dneg had a stronger impact in the SP condition. To assess whether this difference was significant, we ran a regression with the data from both conditions (see column three in Table 3). We added a dummy for the TP condition in this regression, and interacted this dummy with Dneg and Dpos. The regression shows that the TP dummy is insignificant, suggesting that the punishment level was not significantly different across conditions at the egalitarian transfer. The coefficient for the interaction term DnegTP Dummy is significantly negative, however, indicating that punishment was less severe in the TP condition for transfer levels below 50. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 90
Categorization
- XREF: Directly evidences the Hester Prynne third-party-punishment framework in the reader’s analytical integration: the community’s ‘A’ operates on the weaker but still functional third-party channel. — connects to: Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46; Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72 (+5 more)
- QUESTION: Worth chasing: why does third-party punishment fall short of making low transfers unprofitable, and what does that imply for image-scoring-style systems that rely on third parties?
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82; Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 90
Related
- Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.90)
- Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers. (similarity 0.89)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.85)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.84)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.83)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.83)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.83)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.82)
- Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.82)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.81)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.81)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.79)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.79)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.79)
- Antisocial punishment is driven by low contributors’ sense of unfair treatment. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers.
#corroborates(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 102 - Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
#contradicts(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 - Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable.
#corroborates(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117