Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
Evidence
The models of Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) also predict the existence of third-party punishment. The Fehr and Smith model is based on the assumption that there are players who are willing to pay to reduce the differences between their own payoffs and those of other. In the F&F model, players are willing to pay because they view inequalities as unfair; inequality is the trigger of punishment but, in contrast to the Fehr and Smith model, it is not the aim of the players to establish equality. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46
Categorization
- XREF: The contrast between punishing to establish equality versus punishing because inequality is unfair maps onto the Puritan community’s different possible motives for shaming Hester — restoring communal order versus punishing a breach that feels inherently wrong. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 30 (+11 more)
Related
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.93)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.88)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.87)
- Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.87)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.87)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.87)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.87)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.86)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.86)
- Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.83)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.82)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.82)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.82)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.82)
- People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
Broader Connections
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party.
#expands(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72 - Standardizing wages removes the third party’s exploitative advantage
#corroborates(0.75) - Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
#qualifies(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82