Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers.
Evidence
We also found that sanctions by second parties directly harmed were much stronger than third-party sanctions, indeed strong enough to make norm violations unprofitable, whereas the sanctions of a single third party were not. Thus, in the context of our experiment, more than one third party is needed to enforce the norm. However, this condition is probably met frequently in real life. Therefore, taken together, our results suggest that altruistic third-party sanctions are likely to be powerful enforcers of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 148
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s reading purpose: third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher) vs. second-party sanctioning within the indirect reciprocity / image-scoring framework — this passage directly quantifies the strength gap between the two. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29; Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117 (+4 more)
Related
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.92)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.90)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.89)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.88)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.88)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.87)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.87)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.87)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.87)
- Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.85)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.85)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.83)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.82)
- Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. (similarity 0.82)
- Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable.
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 117 - People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 - Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
#contradicts(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82 - Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2