Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection.

Evidence

Our previous emphasis has been on how much potential punishers are willing to pay to punish defectors relative to cooperators. Another question is whether the willingness to incur costs for punishing defectors depends significantly on whether the punisher himself cooperated or defected. This question is particularly interesting in the TP condition because a cooperator has no direct reason to feel exploited by the defection of an outside group member in this condition. However, those subjects who cooperate themselves are perhaps better able to empathize with cooperators in other groups who had to face the defection of their PD partner. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 124

Categorization

• QUESTION: The empathy mechanism proposed here is speculative — worth checking whether later studies directly tested punisher’s own cooperation as a predictor of third-party punishment intensity.
• XREF: Connects to the reading purpose: this is the psychological mechanism behind how observers score cooperative acts — empathy as the micro-foundation of image scoring in third-party punishment. — connects to: Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 103; Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193; Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 133 (+8 more)

Related

• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.90)
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.81)
• People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.81)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.81)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.80)
• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.80)
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.80)
• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.80)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.79)
• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. #corroborates (0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. #corroborates (0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13
• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. #corroborates (0.80) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193
• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members #corroborates (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808
• Trust is sustained by sanctions of relational withdrawal or community shunning #corroborates (0.80)
• Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do #expands (0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 133
• Communal trustworthiness often turns outsiders into targets of abuse #complicates (0.75)
• Confinement to one community makes reputational sanctions powerful enough to guarantee repayment #corroborates (0.75)
• Group-based discipline can coerce as powerfully as individual violence #corroborates (0.75) — , The Rod and the Child, 5601