Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal.
Evidence
As Baumard et al. say, humans don’t just cooperate, they have a sense that this is the right thing to do. This is what lies behind our use of the term “moral altruism” (Van Vugt et al. 2007): we don’t just cooperate but reward altruists and punish non-altruists. “Moralistic” punishment of defectors is itself a behaviour which contributes to reputation (Barclay 2006; Kurzban et al. 2007). Like altruism itself, moral altruism is costly, and as with other costly displays, sexual selection may well play a role in driving the evolution of morality through partner choice for traits that honestly indicate underlying quality (Miller 2007). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 532
Categorization
- XREF: The claim that punishing defectors is itself a costly display that boosts reputation maps onto the fumi-e: the Japanese authorities compel public apostasy precisely to collapse the reputation economy of moralistic virtue signalling. — connects to: Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 534; Fairness evolved as a costly signal of impartiality to avoid third-party condemnation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 574; An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13 (+3 more)
- SEED: An angle: moralistic punishment as conspicuous consumption — how public outrage functions as a partner-choice advertisement rather than genuine prosocial enforcement.
Related
- Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection. (similarity 0.82)
- Low-cost punishment of norm violators is a uniquely human trait. (similarity 0.81)
- Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.81)
- Reputational self-interest alone cannot explain why people act morally when unobserved. (similarity 0.81)
- Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. (similarity 0.79)
- Informal moral behavior builds reputation through accumulated small signals, defeating free-riding. (similarity 0.79)
- Harm prohibitions are as central to morality as fairness (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness evolved as a costly signal of impartiality to avoid third-party condemnation. (similarity 0.78)
- Altruism without genuine moral emotion signals unreliable future cooperation. (similarity 0.78)
- Punishment scales with the unfairness of the wrongdoing, not with deterrence needs (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection.
#corroborates(0.88) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 534 - Fairness evolved as a costly signal of impartiality to avoid third-party condemnation.
#corroborates(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 574 - People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.82) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13 - Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
#expands(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 - Informal moral behavior builds reputation through accumulated small signals, defeating free-riding.
#corroborates(0.78) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 80