Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers.

Evidence

In the SP condition, 26% never punished and 39% only punished transfers below 50. This is reversed in the TP condition, indicating that the lower average sanctions for transfers below 50, relative to the SP condition, were also the result of a smaller number of punishers. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 102

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s Hester Prynne / third-party punishment frame — the shift between second-party and third-party sanctioning maps onto how a visible scarlet A changes who punishes. — connects to: Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 30; Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 14; Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82

Related

• Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.91)
• Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.89)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.84)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.83)
• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.80)
• Antisocial punishment is driven by low contributors’ sense of unfair treatment. (similarity 0.80)
• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.80)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.79)
• A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.79)
• Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.78)