Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes.
Evidence
Since we know already that the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and the pure reciprocity models fail to capture third-party punishment, we concentrate on the other models. The model by Levine predicts no difference between secondand thirdparty punishment, because a given low transfer to the recipient reveals the dictator’s selfish or spiteful preferences regardless of whether the recipient (i.e., the second party) or the third party can punish. Thus, Levine’s model cannot explain the treatment differences. This contrasts with the Fehr–Schmidt and Falk–Fischbacher models, which predict that third parties will punish less than second parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 103
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s analytical frame on Hester’s scarlet A as image scoring — whose model (Levine vs Fehr-Schmidt) matches the Puritan third-party punishment pattern? — connects to: Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72; Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 (+3 more)
- DEFINE: Naming the key distinction between second-party (Levine-style direct reciprocity) and third-party punishment models.
Related
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.90)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.87)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.85)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.85)
- Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.85)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.85)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.85)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.84)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.84)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.83)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.83)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.83)
- Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.83)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.82)
- Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection. (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#expands(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection.
#expands(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 124 - Social norm effects hinge on beliefs that others will enforce them.
#qualifies(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 28