Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties.
Evidence
Further experiments indicate that second parties, whose economic payoff is reduced by the norm violation, punish the violation much more strongly than do third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
Categorization
- XREF: Maps onto the reader’s framework: Hester is punished by the community (third party), but the deepest punitive fury comes from those closest to the offense — a second-party dynamic. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72; Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82 (+4 more)
Related
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.93)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.89)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.88)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.88)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.86)
- Society punishes impropriety more harshly than inhumanity (similarity 0.86)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.85)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.85)
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.84)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.83)
- Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.82)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.81)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.81)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.80)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party.
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72 - Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82 - People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#corroborates(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46