Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms.
Evidence
Fig. 2 indicates that punishment and expectations thereof increased in proportion to the amount by which dictators’ transfers fell short of 50%. The average punishment imposed when A gave nothing was 14 deduction points, that is, reducing A’s income by 42 points, and sanctioning declined monotonically to near zero as transfers reached half of the endowment. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 30
Categorization
- XREF: Directly evidences the reader’s framework of third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher) in the Hester Prynne analysis — the graded, proportional nature of sanctions matches the image-scoring cost model. — connects to: Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 102; Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29; Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 (+2 more)
Related
- Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers. (similarity 0.91)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.90)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.88)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.84)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.83)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.83)
- Antisocial punishment is driven by low contributors’ sense of unfair treatment. (similarity 0.81)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.80)
- Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.80)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.80)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.79)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.79)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#expands(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 - Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers.
#qualifies(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 102 - Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29