Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher

Evidence

This contrasts with the models of Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) because the payoff differences between the third party and the other players matter in these models. Thus, the third party may well punish the defector because the defector earns more than the third party. However, both models have difficulties in explaining the fact that mutual defection is also punished, because the payoff vector in this case is (25, 25, 40) before the punishment decision of C. Since Player C is better off than both A and B, Player C should never punish in this situation, but in fact, 20.8% of the third parties punished, albeit at a rather low level. The model of Levine (1998) is again consistent with the existence of third-party punishment of defectors because defection may be taken as a signal that the defector is a greedy subject. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 66

Categorization

• XREF: The 20.8% punishing despite being better off than both players is the anonymous, no-self-gain version of a norm enforcer; maps onto Dimmesdale’s unprofitable psychological gnawing in the reader’s frame — a signal the model cannot rationalize, like visible A-signaling versus hidden guilt. — connects to: People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147; A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 109; Imprisonment’s rapid acceptance is poorly explained by the prestige of reform models alone — Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish- The Birth of the…, 195
• QUESTION: Levine’s greedy-signal reading is intriguing: if defection is taken as a greed signal, what does Hester’s A signal besides adultery — and what does the community’s refusal to punish mutual defection in-kind reveal about which violations index greed?

Related

• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.87)
• A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.85)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.85)
• Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.82)
• People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.80)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.80)
• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.79)
• Third-party punishment renders defection in a one-shot dyadic exchange unprofitable. (similarity 0.79)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.79)
• Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm #qualifies (0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147