People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm

Evidence

In this paper, we studied the enforcement mechanisms behind social norms, finding that a large percentage of subjects are willing to enforce distribution and cooperation norms even though they incur costs and reap no economic benefit from their sanctions and even though they have not been directly harmed by the norm violation. Thus, third-party sanctions provide a further important example for the notion of strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2003). Our questionnaire results are consistent with the view that third-party sanctions are driven by negative emotions and negative fairness judgments towards norm violators. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Nowak & Sigmund image-scoring and Fehr & Fischbacher third-party punishment framework underpinning the Hester Prynne analysis. — connects to: Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 4; Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 (+16 more)
• SEED: Could seed an essay on strong reciprocity — altruistic punishment without direct harm — as the human foundation for communal moral signaling.

Related

• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.91)
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.89)
• Social norm enforcement may be a defining trait of humanity. (similarity 0.87)
• Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.87)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.86)
• Emotions like anger drive and independently cost norm enforcement (similarity 0.85)
• Low-cost punishment of norm violators is a uniquely human trait. (similarity 0.84)
• Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.83)
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.83)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.81)
• Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.81)
• Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperative punishers may empathize with outside victims of defection. (similarity 0.81)
• Social norm effects hinge on beliefs that others will enforce them. (similarity 0.81)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• A degrading-treatment violation required actual punishment, not merely its credible threat #qualifies (0.85) — , The Rod and the Child, 9212
• Conscience lets society externalize reward costs onto the individual #responds-to (0.80)