Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost.
Evidence
Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punished the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the cooperation norm. Thus, our results show that the notion of strong reciprocity extends to the sanctioning behavior of ”unaffected” third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
Categorization
- XREF: This is Nowak & Sigmund’s ‘image scoring’ in reverse — here the sanctioned party carries the cost, and bystanders enforce without payoff; pairs with the reader’s Hester Prynne framing. — connects to: People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147; Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 (+7 more)
- CANDY: A crisp, memorable stat: roughly two-thirds of bystanders will pay to punish a norm violator even when it costs them.
Related
- Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.92)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.92)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.89)
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm (similarity 0.89)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.88)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.87)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.87)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.86)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.84)
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.83)
- Ernst Fehr — Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms (similarity 0.83)
- Low-cost punishment of norm violators is a uniquely human trait. (similarity 0.82)
- People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.82)
- People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
- Cooperative individuals sanction defectors far more than defectors do (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm
#corroborates(0.98) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 - Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost.
#corroborates(0.97) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 29 - Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.95) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them.
#corroborates(0.92) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46 - An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity.
#expands(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13 - Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties.
#qualifies(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2 - Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors.
#expands(0.82) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 193 - Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers.
#expands(0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 148