Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party.
Evidence
In the DG, second-party punishment means that the recipient, Player B, has the option of punishing the dictator. We developed the following design to compare the relative strength of secondand third-party punishment. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned either the role of the dictator (Player A) or that of the recipient (Player B). Then we formed groups of two players with each group comprising one Player A and one Player B. The players in these groups then participated in a second-party punishment (SP) condition and in a third-party punishment (TP) condition according to the design described below. The sequence of the two conditions was balanced to control for order effects. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 72
Categorization
- DEFINE: Establishes the operational distinction between second-party and third-party punishment in the dictator game—central to the reader’s framework.
- XREF: Connects to Fehr & Fischbacher’s third-party punishment literature that the reader is already integrating. — connects to: Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46; Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 103 (+2 more)
Related
- Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.90)
- Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.88)
- Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.88)
- Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.86)
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.85)
- An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.83)
- A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.83)
- Multiple third-party punishers can make norm violations unprofitable, acting as strong norm enforcers. (similarity 0.82)
- Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.82)
- Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.81)
- Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.80)
- Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.80)
- Punishment scales with the unfairness of the wrongdoing, not with deterrence needs (similarity 0.79)
- Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.79)
- Third-party punishment context reduces the number of punishers who sanction selfish transfers. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment.
#expands(0.90) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 82 - Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes.
#expands(0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 103 - Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms.
#expands(0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2