People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation.

Evidence

Participants played two games: a random income game measuring inequality aversion and a modified PGG with punishment. Johnson et al.’s results suggest that those who exhibit stronger preferences for equality are more willing to punish free-riders in the PGG. The same subjects who assign negative tokens to high earners in the random income experiment also spend significantly more on punishment of low contributors in the PGG, suggesting that even in this game punishment may well be not only about sustaining cooperation but about inequality. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 184

Categorization

• XREF: This cuts against the standard costly-punishment-as-cooperation account and touches the reader’s theme of how moralizing emotions get weaponized to discipline or level status differences. — connects to: Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 831; Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46; People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147 (+6 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: This reframes the entire costly punishment literature: if punishment is partly about levelling rather than cooperation, then the authoritarian enforcement of apostasy (trampling the fumi-e) may index envy of the priest’s higher standing as much as doctrinal control.

Related

• Some punishment in public goods games is retributive justice-seeking, not cooperation enforcement. (similarity 0.87)
• Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games (similarity 0.85)
• Punishing high contributors can erase the cooperative benefits of punishment. (similarity 0.85)
• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.84)
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.84)
• People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.83)
• Punishment scales with the unfairness of the wrongdoing, not with deterrence needs (similarity 0.83)
• A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators. (similarity 0.82)
• Low-cost punishment of norm violators is a uniquely human trait. (similarity 0.82)
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. (similarity 0.82)
• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.81)
• Antisocial punishment is driven by low contributors’ sense of unfair treatment. (similarity 0.80)
• Stranger-based game experiments miss most real moral contexts. (similarity 0.80)
• Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.80)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Punishment functions as negative redistribution to correct prior unfair gains #expands (0.88) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 175
• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. #corroborates (0.85) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 46
• Even unaffected bystanders punish norm violations at personal cost. #corroborates (0.80) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
• Costly norm enforcement by unaffected bystanders reveals strong reciprocity. #corroborates (0.78) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. #corroborates (0.76) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 186
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. #corroborates (0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 13
• People punish norm violations at personal cost even without direct harm #complicates (0.72) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 147
• Proportionate punishment mirrors distributive justice in reverse. #expands (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 90